



## **CRIME**

# **Containing Radicalisation in Modern Europe**







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The CRIME project is a cooperation between CEIS (Compagnie Europeenne d'Ingelligence Strategie; [www.ceis-strat.com](http://www.ceis-strat.com)), TNO (Nederlandse Organisatie voor Toegepast Natuurwetenschappelijk Onderzoek; [www.tno.nl](http://www.tno.nl)), EURISC (European institute for Risk Security & communication management) and the Dutch Ministry of Interior and Kingdom Relations ([www.minbzk.nl](http://www.minbzk.nl)), which is responsible for the coordination of the CRIME project.

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## **Management Summary**

The main goal of CRIME was to improve insight into the radicalisation process, radical groups and how to halt and prevent radicalisation. This was divided into four sub-goals. First, to develop typologies of a number of different operational radical groups. Second, to develop a model, which describes the process through which an individual goes on the path from moderation to radical extremism and terrorism. Third, to survey interventions intended to halt or prevent radicalisation and map these onto the process model. Fourth, to present an overview of EU guidelines and policy regarding radicalisation.

The development of the typologies yielded graphic representations of four types of radical groups: nationalist/separatist groups, leftist groups, radical Islamic groups and leftist groups in the 1970's and 80's . What these representations show is that different types of radical groups have different natures in terms of factors such as support base, positions and status in regards to their area of operation etc.; they cannot all be lumped together, but must be dealt with in manners befitting their nature.

The process model of radicalisation gives a systematic overview of the elements involved in an individual's journey from moderation to radical extremism. The focus of this model is on the psychological processes occurring within the individual as an independent entity, and within the individual as part of a group.

The work on interventions to halt or prevent radicalisation revealed that different phases of the radicalisation process require different intervention strategies. In the analysis conducted in CRIME, we have mapped (types of) interventions available and currently being implemented, to the phase in the process where they would be most effective.

The European Union identified, and rightly so, the fight against terrorism as one of the greatest challenges the Union is currently facing. The complex nature of this phenomenon forced the EU to adopt a multi-pronged approach; one of them being the radicalisation of individuals who would turn to violent means in order to foster their political agenda. The overview of EU guidelines and policy regarding terrorism and radicalisation was instrumental in realising that due to the complex nature of such issues, the scope of EU's response to terrorism and radicalisation was gradually enlarged and became increasingly integrated. In the process, more and more European bodies worked on the issue, as witnessed for instance by the involvement of



the Committee of the Regions. The last initiative in this field, namely the Stockholm Programme, reflects the European approach to fighting violent radicalisation by integrating a wide range of policies in a coherent and comprehensive framework.



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# 1. Introduction

The urgency for a better understanding of the process of radicalisation has increased significantly due to high profile terrorist attacks such as 9/11, and the Madrid and London bombings. Until recently, the research on radicalisation has often been focussed on identifying profiles of radicals in order to be able to predict who would be prone to radicalisation and who would not. The term “root causes” is used often for this kind of research<sup>1</sup>. Looking for root causes is problematic, however. Given the variety and scope of radical groups, it would be foolish to believe that concrete psychological principles can be adduced that apply to and explain all radical groups’ behaviour<sup>2</sup>. In recent years, the focus of research has shifted to the question of how people radicalise and what authorities can do to combat the spreading of radicalisation<sup>3</sup>. The CRIME project is therefore focussed on the *process* of radicalisation instead of on who will or will not radicalise. In the CRIME project we look at different types of violent radical groups, the process of radicalisation and intervention guidelines for professionals in the field.

## 1.1 Problem definition

Recent research has inventoried existing knowledge and understanding of the process of radicalisation. However, being primarily academic, this information is less useful to professionals working in the field. Consequently, professionals lack a practical model and supporting tools to integrate both academic and practical efforts in this area and to be a driving force in the development of a strategy to prevent or halt the process of radicalisation. Nowadays, many parties such as police, social workers and teachers are involved in the fight against radicalisation but their efforts are not always structured and coordinated. As a result, there is often a lack of awareness of the availability and effectiveness of methods, tools and guidelines. Moreover, this isolation interferes with the emergence of an integrated approach to combat violent radicalisation. In practical terms, this lack of an integrated strategy laid down into coordinated

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<sup>1</sup>For example:

[http://www.justitsministeriet.dk/fileadmin/downloads/Forskning\\_og\\_dokumentation/Home\\_grown\\_terrorism\\_and\\_Islamist\\_radicalisation\\_in\\_Europe\\_-\\_an\\_assessment\\_of\\_influencing\\_factors\\_2\\_.pdf](http://www.justitsministeriet.dk/fileadmin/downloads/Forskning_og_dokumentation/Home_grown_terrorism_and_Islamist_radicalisation_in_Europe_-_an_assessment_of_influencing_factors_2_.pdf)

<http://www.transnationalterrorism.eu/tekst/publications/Causal%20Factors.pdf>

<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/00102.pdf>

<sup>2</sup> Reich, W. (2009) Understanding terrorist behaviour: the limits and opportunities of psychological inquiry. In: Victorhoff J. & Kruglanski, A. W. (2009). Psychology of Terrorism. Classic and Contemporary insights. Psychology Press.

<sup>3</sup> Bjørge, Tore, ed. (2005). Root causes of terrorism: Myths, realities, ways forward. London: Routledge; Horgan, J. (2008). From profiles to pathways and roots to routes; Perspectives from psychology on radicalization into terrorism. ANNALS, AAPSS, 618, 80-94.



efforts hampers the exchange of experiences and the development of a structured approach which regards to responding to and supporting high-risk individuals. In sum, the problem at hand is that existing information regarding to the process of radicalisation is 1) too abstract to be much of use in practice and 2) too fragmented to provide a better understanding of the problem and effective prevention and intervention.

## **1.2 Objectives and research questions**

The main objective of this project was to combine the accumulated body of academic knowledge and understanding with practical experience from the field to address the practical problems professionals working in this field are faced with. We did this in two distinct phases: first, we structured the radicalisation process by creating a typology of radical groups (focused on radical groups in Europe). In practical terms this involved the collection of knowledge on *who* these groups are and their characteristics. In a second step, we combined existing process models of radicalisation to create a complete process model of radicalisation. In this phase the overarching question was *how* individuals in groups radicalise.

A further objective of the CRIME project was to develop potential interventions and guidelines relevant to (parts of) the process model. We collected and categorised various kinds of different interventions, all aimed at preventing or halting the process of radicalisation. In this phase our focus was on the question *what* can be done about radicalisation.

To sum up, the research questions in CRIME were:

- *Who* are the groups that radicalise in Europe and what are their characteristics?
- *How* do individuals in these groups radicalise?
- *What* can be done to prevent or halt radicalisation at an individual or group level?



### **1.3 Structure of the report**

This report consists of eight chapters. In the remainder of this chapter we will give a short introduction to the CRIME project. In the next chapter 2 we will describe the procedure of the CRIME project and the methods we used.

Chapter 3 focuses on what we perceive radicalisation to be and what definition of radicalisation we chose to use in the CRIME project.

Chapter 4 focuses on who the groups are that radicalize in Europe and what their characteristics are. The result of this chapter is a typology of radical groups and an overview of priorities for action.

Chapter 5 focuses on how individuals in groups radicalize. The result of this chapter is a process model of radicalisation and a description of the further research needed to complete missing details of the model.

In Chapter 6 an overview of preventive, curative and repressive intervention guidelines to counter radicalisation is described. These intervention guidelines can be used by professionals who work directly with (potential) radical youngsters. In short, the chapter focuses on what can be done to prevent or halt radicalisation.

Chapter 7 gives an overview of the past and ongoing initiatives to counter radicalisation at the European level. These initiatives are policy level interventions and the chapter gives an overview of the evolutions of EU policies in this field in the past years.

In Chapter 8 we draw general conclusions about what governments and professionals in the field can do with the knowledge developed in the CRIME project and presented in this report.



## 2. Methods and Procedures

In the CRIME project we examined literature from academic and field-reports. The literature was used to develop a conceptual model of the process of radicalisation and typologies of radicalisation. The typology and the process model were discussed in several international workshops with international experts (see Appendix 1) in the field of radicalisation and terrorism. These workshops were held in the following locations:

- 1 Workshop I: Brussels, Belgium, September 24, 2008
- 2 Workshop II: Oegstgeest, The Netherlands, November 10, 2008
- 3 Workshop III: Paris, France, July 6, 2009
- 4 Workshop IV: Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 28-29 October, 2009

Also, during the project we collected interventions and guidelines for working with high-risk individuals through a literature review, workshops and interviews with relevant professionals.

For the timeline, see Figure 1.




Figure 1. Timeline CRIME project

In this chapter, we provide a more detailed overview of the activities undertaken in CRIME.

### 2.1 Workshop I: Definition of Radicalisation.

Goal of the day was to develop a shared understanding of the definition of radicalisation. There are many different views on the definition of radicalisation. Some European countries describe radicalisation through specific cases referring to recent national events. For example, the Netherlands will mostly refer to the Hofstad Group and Mohammed B (assassin of Theo van



Gogh) to define the steps of radicalisation. France and Spain might focus on ETA. In order to succeed in this project, the colleagues from academia in CRIME needed to develop a shared understanding of each other's views on the definition of radicalisation. Our starting point was the definition already maintained by the DG JLS (see Chapter 3), however, we allowed ourselves the freedom to digress from this definition in cases where we found it did not satisfactorily cover the material.

During this internal workshop each of the participating parties (CEIS, TNO, EURISC) discussed their thoughts on the following questions:

- What is radicalisation?
- What is the best definition of radicalisation?

Views on the definition of radicalisation will be described in the next chapter.

## **2.2 Development of typologies and process model.**

After the working definition for radicalisation was reached, we conducted a two-pronged research of the existing literature: one to create the typologies of radicalisation and another to create the process model of radicalisation.

### Typologies of radicalisation

The CRIME project builds on the result of a previous study conducted by CEIS on behalf of DG JLS of the European Commission and entitled "The factors that may possibly trigger or affect violent radicalization processes, particularly among youth".

However, the scope of the CRIME project is wider than the aforementioned study because it also includes research on radical leftist as well as nationalist movements. Therefore, a thorough study of relevant terrorist groups at the European level was carried out. We reviewed the literature available on this issue and conducted a parallel study of media resources pertinent to radicalization. Our conclusion was that the distinction between nationalist-separatist and internationalist violent groups, such as radical leftists and violent radical Islamists, was relevant.

In a second step we had to look for the most suitable way to graphically represent the results, keeping in mind that the models should prove to be a useful support to devise and illustrate recommendations. It appeared that since the recommendations needed to be action-oriented we had to prioritize the representation of relevant characteristics to determine the appropriate type of intervention.



Applying the three circles model developed by Lucien Poirier in 1974 to build the French nuclear deterrence doctrine, we distinguished three different circles, namely:

- National level
- European and periphery level
- Rest of the world

For each level, specific means of actions and specific objectives were defined. With this framework in mind, we determined in which of the three circles each violent radical groups would fit.

Drawing from the findings of the typology, we determined key social institutions existing in the European society, and we graphically represented the connection between these institutions and the different violent radical groups. These social institutions, namely political associations, youth associations, social associations and ideological association, social networks and support bases, were drawn from the typology.

The outcome is three graphics, with the same background, representing the three kinds of violent radical groups analysed, in their respective geopolitical dimension, which provides the keys to design the appropriate counter actions.

#### Process model

We conducted a literature study on existing process models. Based on the different kinds of models we researched, our aim was to construct an integrated general theoretical model to describe the process of radicalisation. We performed this part in multiple steps. In the first step, we inventoried aspects of the radicalisation process using the existing models. Second, we put all these aspects on separate papers, each noting one word or concept. In the third step we categorized all the papers into groups and decided if the group should be considered a mental process, a state, a trigger, or a behaviour. At the end of this step, each group consisted of one or more papers that belong together, and was given a name. Finally, in the last step, we used these groups as the starting point for our model, and put them in the best possible chronological order.



### 2.3 Workshop II: Expert discussion

The goal of this workshop was to evaluate and improve the general theoretical process model and the typologies of radicalisation based on the opinions of experts in the field of radicalisation. The expert input should lead to a new version of the radicalisation model and provide an overview of methods that could be used to validate the final model.

During the workshop we focused on a specific set of questions referring to the generalization, content, shape and validation of the model. These questions were as follows:

- How can we generalise the model without losing important detailed information?
- Is the model complete with regard to content?
- Is the model complete with regard to form?
- How can we validate the model?

We divided their recommendations into *long term advice* and *short term solutions* and applied the short term solutions to create the second version of the typologies and process models.

### 2.4 Collection of interventions

Interventions used by professionals in the field and at the EU level to prevent or halt radicalisation were inventoried. Most of the knowledge on interventions for professionals in the field is based on recent research<sup>4</sup>. In this study Dutch interventions to prevent or halt radicalisation were collected and structured. Also, essential pre-conditions were defined. If not taken into account these essential pre-conditions, interventions will not be successful. For the CRIME project we conducted a state of the art literature study and an international workshop to analyse new information. An overview of the interventions collected for professionals in the field can be found in Chapter 6 and an overview of interventions at the EU level can be found in Chapter 7. An overview of EU actions can be found in Appendix 2.

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<sup>4</sup> Lousberg, M, Hemert van, D., Langelaan, S. (2009). Ingrijpen bij radicalisering- de mogelijkheden van de eerstelijnswerker. TNO DV 2009 C365.



## **2.5 Workshop III: Interventions**

For the interventions workshop several professionals from the field were invited to discuss interventions to prevent or halt radicalisation in an international forum. Goal of the day was to find out if the way European professionals deal with potential radicals is similar across countries

or if it differs for different countries. We did this by presenting a case to a group of experts that we divided into several sub groups. The experts were asked to discuss the case and to come up with a combined plan to halt the radicalisation of the specific individual described in the case. Also, it was another opportunity to present the new versions of the typology and the process model of radicalisation to gather more input from professionals on these models. The case that was used during the workshop can be found in Appendix 3.

## **2.6 Integration**

The parallel aspects of the CRIME projects (typology, process model and interventions) were discussed and synthesized in order to yield a coherent final product.

## **2.7 Workshop IV: The final workshop**

The final workshop was combined with the Cities Conference held on the 28<sup>th</sup> and 29<sup>th</sup> of October 2009 in Amsterdam organised by the Program Polarisation and Radicalisation of the Dutch Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations. The goal of this workshop was to present our findings to a very diverse audience consisting of scientists and field professionals alike. The workshop consisted of two sessions: one on the process model and one on the typologies. In both cases, we started by presenting the final versions of the model. Workshop participants were instructed to note “whatever comes to mind” during the presentation on Post-its®. After the presentation the Post-its® were placed on a big board and discussed with the group.



### **3. Definition of Radicalisation**

The CRIME project focused on the phenomenon of violent radicalisation. As stated by the DG JLS in its Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council concerning terrorist recruitment: “*Violent radicalisation is the phenomenon of people embracing opinions, views and ideas which could lead to acts of terrorism as defined in Article 1 of the Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism*”.

*Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism (2002/475/JHA):*

*Article 1 - Terrorist offences and fundamental rights and principles*

*1. Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the intentional acts referred to below in points (a) to (i), as defined as offences under national law, which, given their nature or context, may seriously damage a country or an international organisation where committed with the aim of:*

*- seriously intimidating a population, or*

*- unduly compelling a Government or international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act, or*

*- seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation,*

*shall be deemed to be terrorist offences:*

*(a) attacks upon a person's life which may cause death;*

*(b) attacks upon the physical integrity of a person;*

*(c) kidnapping or hostage taking;*

*(d) causing extensive destruction to a Government or public facility, a transport system, an infrastructure facility, including an information system, a fixed platform located on the*



*continental shelf, a public place or private property likely to endanger human life or result in major economic loss;*

*(e) seizure of aircraft, ships or other means of public or goods transport;*

*(f) manufacture, possession, acquisition, transport, supply or use of weapons, explosives or of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, as well as research into, and development of, biological and chemical weapons;*

*(g) release of dangerous substances, or causing fires, floods or explosions the effect of which is to endanger human life;*

*(h) interfering with or disrupting the supply of water, power or any other fundamental natural resource the effect of which is to endanger human life;*

*(i) threatening to commit any of the acts listed in (a) to (h).*

*2. This Framework Decision shall not have the effect of altering the obligation to respect fundamental rights and fundamental legal principles as enshrined in Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union.*

Consequently CRIME focused on people intending to commit or get involved in terrorist/violent acts. We did not focus on people's political views or motivations.

We also chose to focus on "violent radical/terrorist" organisations, rather than on individuals ("lone wolves"). This was done in order to remain in accordance with the Framework Decision on Combating terrorism, which states in Article 2: "*For the purposes of this Framework Decision, "radical group" shall mean: a structured group of more than two persons, established over a period of time and acting in concert to commit terrorist offences. "Structured group" shall mean a group that is not randomly formed for the immediate commission of an offence and that does not need to have formally defined roles for its members, continuity of its membership or a developed structure.*"



## **4. The typological model: *Who* are the groups that radicalise in Europe and what are their characteristics?**

In order to propose recommendations to design interventions aimed at tackling violent radicalization, a careful study of different radical violent groups, and more specifically of their social embedding, is needed. In the following chapters we will adopt a comparative approach in order to assess the different characteristics of such groups. The final objective is to build a typology on which recommendations can be based.

In this process three types of groups will be studied: nationalist-separatist groups, radical leftist groups and radical Islamist groups.

Violent radical right-wing groups will not be taken into consideration in the framework of this study due to space constraints. However this does not mean that they do not pose a threat at the European level.

In Section 4.1 of this chapter we will propose a list of criteria that we consider relevant for devising counter strategies. For instance a group benefitting from some public support and embedded in the general society will be harder to defeat than a group deprived of a strong social embedding. Also it will be harder to engage in talks and hold negotiations with groups acting in the name of a utopia than with groups that have tangible claims.

For each category of criteria a short justification will be provided to explain in which way they are relevant to devise counter-actions (Section 4.2).

Having taken into account the criteria listed in the first paragraph, it would appear that the distinction between nationalist-separatist, radical-leftist and violent radical-Islamist groups is relevant to design counter strategies. The three types of groups indeed have different characteristics at crucial levels for action such as support among the general public, nature and scope of the claims and socialization places.

In the third section of this chapter (4.3) we will present graphs of the social embedding of different groups so that relevant levels for intervention can be determined.



Section 4.4 is dedicated to the typology's implications regarding the relevant level to develop counteractions.

#### **4.1 List of radical violent groups characteristics that should be taken into account while developing counterstrategies**

In order to build this typology, we will first focus on listing a number of criteria describing the main characteristics of violent radical groups. The combined features included in this list aim at providing a comprehensive description of the nature and the structure of violent radical and terrorist groups.

The characteristics chosen can be divided in 5 categories: main features, structure, membership, objectives and activities. Each category is divided into several sub-divisions in order to provide a more precise description.

##### **4.1.1. Main features of violent radical and terrorist groups**

Relevance of the following criteria to develop counter-actions:

- **Group size:** a smaller group will be more vulnerable to a wave of arrests than a bigger group
- **Support base among the general society:** a group benefitting from some support in the general society (that is outside the radical violent group *per se* and outside the social network of its members) will be harder to defeat, than a group lacking a support base.
- **Location of the base of operations:** combating a group operating in different Member States requires cooperation between the involved Member States

##### *Size of the group*

If we consider groups currently active in the EU, only ETA has a significant membership (around 300 members according to the START database<sup>5</sup>). Violent radical leftist groups usually count less than 50 members.

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<sup>5</sup> Terrorist Organisations Profiles, *Basque Fatherland and Freedom (ETA)*, National Consortium responsible for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, University of Maryland  
[http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data/tops/terrorist\\_organization\\_profile.asp?id=31](http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=31)



Some data seem to imply that the global violent radical Islamist movement has a bigger membership than other groups. Indeed *“since the August 1998 attacks against the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es-Salaam, ‘al-Qaeda’ has been the target of the most extensive law enforcement and intelligence dragnet in world history. [...] Some 7, 000 of its multinational membership have been arrested in more than 60 countries around the globe; themselves nationals from as many countries again, if not more.”*<sup>6</sup> That said, Al Qaeda at the global level is a franchise (as opposed to a single centralized group), whose name can be used by very different entities with few or no connection at all to the historical leadership. At the EU level, cells conducting actions in the name of Al Qaeda’s ideology tend to be rather small (from four to ten individuals).

#### *Support base among the general public*

As violent groups do not have public records it is difficult to estimate their support base. However two factors could help us to evaluate the degree of support they get from within the general public: the existence (or non-existence) of political/social/ideological/youth associations sharing most of their political agenda and the consequence of waves of arrests on their activities. It is likely that groups, which are part of a broader network of associations and political parties sharing at least part of their agenda, enjoy more public support than groups deprived of social embedding. Groups whose actions are not completely disrupted after a wave of arrests and which are able to maintain operations for several decades certainly benefit from a stronger support base than the others.

According to these criteria we can differentiate ETA and IRA from leftist groups. The former have/had a strong support base, some legal/illegal political representation (*Batasuna/Sinn Fein*) and are/were the two oldest terrorist groups in EU.

They also benefit/benefitted from the support of a significant minority of the population. For instance the Basque organization ETA is not isolated. It is indeed embedded in a network of organizations and institutions with close or loose affiliation with the terrorist group. This is represented in the following graphic.

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<sup>6</sup> RAUFER, Xavier, *Chaos, Terrorism and Beyond : proposals for a diagnosis*, June 2006




Figure 2. Network Structure of the BNLM

As opposed to ETA, leftist groups had fewer social or political organizational supports for their goals and ceased most of their activities after the waves of arrests in the 1970's and 1980's. Their structure consisted of a hard core of clandestine activists engaged in violent activities and



supported by a second circle of sympathizers who provided some logistical support. However the third circle, namely a minority of the population supporting to some extent the general objective of the group, was way too small to allow these groups to complete their agenda<sup>7</sup>.

Nowadays only a few splinter groups, lacking a support base, are still conducting operations on a limited scale. Yet the threat did not completely disappear. As Dr. Maria Alvanou warned: “it is not true that the security problem for EU countries emerges only from ‘outside inspiration’ and only from the Jihadi menace. In fact domestic, ‘traditional’ left wing terrorist groups do continue to pose a security threat<sup>8</sup>.”

As for Al Qaeda, the alleged support base of this movement is the Ummah or the vast global Muslim community. It is however doubtful that Al Qaeda’s support in the Muslim community is very wide, especially after the bombings in Morocco, Saudi Arabia and Iraq, in which Muslims were killed. One could also be sceptical regarding the unity of the Ummah, considering that the Muslim community is divided in various sects, juridical schools and ethnicities, which are scattered in different countries. Regarding the first criteria one could say that the global agenda of this movement does not benefit from a wide public support in Western Europe or elsewhere (except for some areas in Pakistan and Afghanistan), as no political group officially shares the same objectives. In North Africa, some terrorist organizations/rebel groups adopted the Al Qaeda label, however they do not benefit from a strong local support base.

Regarding the second criterion, the massive police operations across EU in the wake of 9/11 had an important impact on the “quality” of the operations. Indeed “[violent radical Islamist] operatives tend to be a mile wide but an inch deep — meaning that while there are many of them, they are often quite inept at terrorist tradecraft<sup>9</sup>”. As a conclusion Al Qaeda does not benefit from a large support among the general European public and also is vulnerable to waves of arrests. The continuation of operations within EU is made possible through the use of the general franchise by violent radical Islamist self-starter cells not directly linked to the historic leadership.

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<sup>7</sup> CHOQUET, Christian, *Le terrorisme est-il une menace de défense?*, Culture & Conflits 44, Winter 2001, <http://www.conflits.org/index732.html>

<sup>8</sup> ALVANOU, Maria, Dr., *Left wing terrorist groups in European countries: a threat still Alive*, ITSTIME/ Italian Team for Security, Terroristic Issues & Managing Emergencies, May 2007, [http://www.itstime.it/Approfondimenti/Left\\_wing\\_terrorist.pdf](http://www.itstime.it/Approfondimenti/Left_wing_terrorist.pdf)

<sup>9</sup> BURTON, Fred, STEWART, Scott, *The Jihadist Threat and Grassroots Defense*, Stratfor, August 13, 2008, [http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/jihadist\\_threat\\_and\\_grassroots\\_defense](http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/jihadist_threat_and_grassroots_defense)



At the European level it should nonetheless be noted that self-starter groups, whose members often were raised in the EU, are not completely isolated from the society they live in. By definition they are not “*foreign fighters*” or complete outsiders. As Nicola Horsburgh and Jordan Javier pointed out: “an important lesson learned by the Jihadist grand network in Spain is that these groups create subcultures to captivate new members and secure the perseverance of militants. Within these subcultures, members know each other and maintain frequent contact<sup>10</sup>.”. In other words these groups are part of a broader social network. However, when compared to nationalist-separatist groups, it appears that “the ‘support community’ is more restricted and the ‘relation community’ (friends and family) might not be aware fully of the clandestine activities certain members are involved in<sup>11</sup>.” Such a comment implies that violent radical Islamist groups lack a significant support base in the EU.

#### *Location of the base of operations*

National separatist groups tend to operate in several countries located around the territory, which they aspire to control (Spain, France and now Portugal in the case of ETA). Most violent radical leftist groups operate in a small area (Athens metropolitan area for the Revolutionary Nuclei) and sometimes in an entire state (GRAPO in Spain). Al Qaeda is the exception as it operates on a global scale. The so-called leadership is thought to be somewhere in the tribal zones between Afghanistan and Pakistan. However the movement as a whole is widely dispersed, in that many local groups (in Pakistan, Africa, Middle East, Europe) use the Al Qaida franchise. In the EU, self-starter violent radical Islamist cells, whose only link to the hardcore is often ideological, tend to strike close to the place of residence of their members.

#### **4.1.2. Structures**

Relevance of the following criteria to develop counter-actions:

- **General structure and command and control:** groups with a hierarchical structure and top down command and control are more likely to be able to engage in negotiations and to respect a truce than loose ideological networks, whose cells are completely autonomous

#### *General structure description*

Groups such as ETA and IRA have/had a very hierarchical structure as a whole, with territorially organized divisions. For instance the IRA had a supreme authority know as the General Army

<sup>10</sup> HORSBURGH, Nicola, JAVIER, Jordan, *Jihadist Subculture of Terrorism in Spain*, International Policy Institute, War Studies Group, King’s College, London

<sup>11</sup> *ibid*



Convention (GAC), supervising a General Headquarter, which was exerting control over a Northern and Southern Command<sup>12</sup>.

Smaller organizations, such as the radical leftist groups, are also hierarchically structured. However, due to their limited membership, the leadership is in more direct contact with the rank and file.

An organization such as Al Qaeda used to be hierarchically structured at the beginning of the 1990's, when Osama Bin Laden and several of his followers started the organization. At that time Al Qaeda was composed of a *Shura* (High Council) and four units respectively in charge of political, financial military and information issues<sup>13</sup>. It then transformed into a hybrid network to conduct its major strikes (US embassy bombings in Africa and 9/11). In short, general guidelines and some logistic help were provided by the leadership, which was loosely connected to different cell leaders operating autonomously.

After the massive US operation in Afghanistan, the leadership of Al Qaeda has been severely disrupted: the remaining leaders were forced into hiding in isolated areas between Afghanistan and Pakistan. In addition, strict borders controls and police measures around the world made it harder for Al Qaeda to function as a loosely organized network. According to Olivier Roy it would now be impossible for them to run a large-scale attack such as 9/11. However as the bombings across the world and the uncovering of various terrorist cells across Europe have demonstrated, Al Qaeda still exists although it went through another transformation and now appears to be a very hard-to-describe reality. As Xavier Raufier put it: “when official America talks about ‘Al-Qaeda’ or the Iraqi insurgents, they suggest an I.R.A.-type organization, with an ‘Army council’, a general staff, and Abu-Musab al-Zarqawi in the role of Officer-in-Command (O.C.) of the Baghdad Brigade. However, the jihadi current is anything but stable and rational. It is changeable, intermittent, chameleon-like<sup>14</sup>”.

However “although the grand network is decentralized at the global level, elements of hierarchy do exist at the sub-level. However, this is not a rigid hierarchy. There are numerous contacts and agreements between members on the same level, but they work under the co-ordination of the

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<sup>12</sup> BOYNE, Sean, *Uncovering the Irish Republican Army*, Jane's intelligence review, August 1, 1996

<sup>13</sup> PENZAR, Drazen, SRBLJINOVIC, Armano, *About Modelling of Complex Networks with Applications to Terrorist Groups Modelling*, September 2005

<sup>14</sup> RAUFER, Xavier, *Chaos, Terrorism and Beyond : proposals for a diagnosis*, June 2006



leader at the sub-level<sup>15</sup>.” In short, at a local level the cells are hierarchically structured, whereas the movement as a whole could be described as a “*dune organization*”<sup>16</sup>”.

#### *Command and control*

In hierarchical organizations such as the nationalist-separatist and radical leftist organizations the command and control structure is precisely determined and vertical: specific orders are issued by the leadership and are then carried out by the rank and file. Dražen Penzar and Armano Srbljinović pointed out that: “to control the amount of violence it is necessary that organization’s ‘political arms’ control terrorist activities. Lower-ranking members need to be under strict control of higher headquarters in order to prevent undesirable individual transgressions. This is why the organizations like the Red Brigades, ETA, or IRA are strictly hierarchically structured”<sup>17</sup>”

At the organization’s level, one needs to distinguish Al Qaeda’s hard core from the self-starter cells in EU conducting terrorist actions using the group label. Indeed, outside Afghanistan and Pakistan, the hard core is not exerting any command and control on the various franchises. The cells act in a completely autonomous way (type of action, target selection) and the hard core then sanctions actions on an opportunistic basis. In the EU, these cells rarely are connected to one another or to the hardcore and are hierarchically structured.

#### **4.1.3. Membership**

Relevance of the following criteria to develop counter-actions:

- **Identity markers of the members:** in case the identity marker is based on a narrative or an ideology, it might be possible to provide alternatives, which is more difficult if the identity marker is reality-based (territorial belonging, cultural features)
- **Relationship of the recruits to the family context:** in the event the individuals are taking over the mission of their parents/elders, it is very difficult to use counter actions based on education

<sup>15</sup> HORSBURGH, Nicola, JAVIER, Jordan, *Jihadist Subculture of Terrorism in Spain*, International Policy Institute, War Studies Group, King’s College, London

<http://www.inter-disciplinary.net/ati/violence/v5/horsburgh%20paper.pdf>

<sup>16</sup> MISHAL, Shaul, ROSENTHAL, Maoz, *Al Qaeda as a Dune Organization: Toward a Typology of Islamic Terrorist Organizations*, Department of Political Science, Tel Aviv University Tel Aviv, Israel, October 2004

<sup>17</sup> PENZAR, Drazen, SRBLJINOVIC, Armano, *About Modelling of Complex Networks with Applications to Terrorist Groups Modelling*, September 2005



- **Pool of potential recruits:** a group with a wide/renewable/"natural" pool of potential recruits will prove harder to defeat than a group with a limited pool of recruits, and in constant search of new members to carry on its operations

### *Identity markers of the members*

In the case of nationalist/separatist groups the identity marker is quite intuitive: it is directly related to the member's territorial belonging (Basque Country or Northern Ireland) and of particular cultural elements. Some other identity markers (religious/ideological) can also exist, however the territorial affiliation and culture are the crucial markers, without which the group would not exist. The members of such groups feel that their identity, which can be defined with reality-based characteristics, is threatened by the actions of the central state. This Basque militant's declaration is particularly instructive in this regard: "The Spanish Estate doesn't recognise us as a political problem but as crazy people shooting... The state power is banks, military, capitalism, and they don't want to accept Basque traditions, culture, and language. You have to realise, Spain came here. They are trying to put their culture, their language here<sup>18</sup>."

For radical leftist groups active in Europe the identity marker is more related to sharing and being ready to violently enforce the set of beliefs of the organizations, which have a leftist revolutionary approach.

In the case of Al Qaeda it would be tempting to consider that the identity marker is strongly related to religion/set of beliefs (radical Islam) and immigrant background of the members. However a key MI5 report (2008) made the following findings:

*"it is estimated that some 80 percent of new recruits to the global Salafi jihad are children and grandchildren of Muslim migrants who have felt alienated from their host culture. The alienation is the driving force behind not only Islamist radicalization but also the radicalization that results in more quotidian political and social violence<sup>19</sup>."*

"The most commonly experienced motivation for resorting to terrorism at the group level appears to be the doctrines and ideas of global jihad against aggressors attacking Islam and

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<sup>18</sup> quoted in RIDLEY, Dominic, *Bloody bequest*, The Guardian, April 2001  
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,4173228,00.html>

<sup>19</sup> POST, Jerrold M., SHEFFER Gabriel, *The risk of radicalisation and Terrorism in U.S. Muslim Communities*, Spring/Summer 2007



Muslims,” Peter Nesser argued. He continued that “in accordance with al-Qaeda’s ideology they linked together the symbolically important jihadist struggles in Palestine, Algeria, Chechnya and the Iraq war, with regional European issues such as tightened security, restrictive immigration legislation, as well as prosecution of jihadists in European countries in the aftermath of 9/11.”<sup>20</sup>

In short the determining identity marker could be described as the adhesion to Al Qaeda’s narrative<sup>21</sup>. That is why it is not surprising to find many (but not exclusively) people belonging to minorities involved in Al Qaeda type activities. It is not a direct consequence of their religion or their immigrant background; it is rather due to the fact that they are the most likely to identify with the idea of the *Ummah and the struggle of all Muslims against “un-believers”*. On the one hand, due to being caught between two cultures, they might have more difficulties than the rest of the population in defining their own identity. In this sense the existence of a so-called united Muslim community can be appealing, as it can provide a new sense of belonging. On the other hand, because they are more likely to have experienced some rejection by the rest of the population and to feel alienated in the country where they are living, Al Qaeda may form an appealing option. However the narrative, in its revolutionary aspects, might also be appealing for people belonging to the majority hence the “Caucasian recruits” of Al Qaeda inspired jihadist cells. It means that the conversion to radical Islam is more a symptom (a necessary step to become part of the *Ummah*) than a cause of the decision to engage in terrorist activities.

#### *Relationship of the members to their family context*

Mr. Post draws an interesting distinction between left wing radical groups (Italian Red Brigades, the Baader-Meinhof Gang), and the nationalist/separatist groups such as the ETA, or the IRA, stating that: “There would seem to be a profound difference between terrorists bent on destroying their own society, the “world of their fathers,” and those whose terrorist activities carry on the mission of their fathers. To put it in other words, for some, becoming terrorists is an act of retaliation for real and imagined hurts against the society of their parents; for others, it is an act of retaliation against society for the hurt done to their parents”<sup>22</sup>.

In the case of national separatist organizations the young generation is often carrying on the actions of the elders. As a 21-year-old female Basque militant put it: "All my family are Basque

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<sup>20</sup> NESSER, Petter, *Profiles of Jihadist terrorists in Europe*, Published in “*A Future for the Young, Options for helping Middle Eastern Youth Escape the Trap of Radicalization*” (Bernard 2006), RAND, Washington

<sup>21</sup> ROY, Olivier, *Al Qaeda in the West as a Youth Movement : The power of a narrative*, CEPS Policy Brief, August 2008

<sup>22</sup> POST (1997), quoted in HUDSON, Rex A., *The sociology and Psychology of Terrorism : who becomes a terrorist and why ?*, Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, september 1999



nationalists. We have always been close to the conflict. My uncle was in prison, for collaboration with ETA, for five or six years."<sup>23</sup>

The same cannot be said about the members of radical left-wing groups, who are fighting against the very society embodied by the generation of their parents. As Wasmund explains for the German Red Army factions, before joining the movement the future recruits severed their ties with their former environment, and especially with their families: "in the course of this early phase, the decisive processes of dissociation with existing social links, such as the parental home, family, partner, place of residence, and habitual milieu took place [...] Ultimately, there follows a total break with the existing social milieu<sup>24</sup>." In a nutshell "while members of the separatist groups were well known in communities, and made contact with friends and family outside the group, anti-system groups severed ties with family and friends."<sup>25</sup>

As for violent radical Islamists, their decision to join the movement often corresponds to a rupture with the traditional family context. Generally speaking, the parents of a violent radical are not aware of his<sup>26</sup> activities; witness the case of Shahid Malik "*Britain's youngest terrorist*<sup>27</sup>". As Olivier Roy pointed out: "Joining Al Qaeda is usually a posture of defiance towards parents and traditional family<sup>28</sup>." More specifically "as young Muslims question the 'purity' of their parents' religious faith and practices, they attempt to reinvent 'an Islam free of local traditions and cultural practices'"<sup>29</sup>.

#### *Set of beliefs and pool of potential recruits*

The nationalists/separatists' set of beliefs is closely related to the local political context. It could be described as "*locally insurrectional*", the main idea being gaining independence/autonomy for a given territory where they are operating. The outside world is not a primary concern. The number of potential recruits is limited to the radical fringe of the population living inside the

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<sup>23</sup> quoted in RIDLEY, Dominic, *Bloody bequest*, The Guardian, April 2001

<http://www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,4173228,00.html>

<sup>24</sup> WASMUND, Klaus, *The Political Socialization of West German Terrorists*, in MERKL Peter H., ed., *Political Violence and Terror: Motifs and Motivations*, Berkley: University of California Press, 1986

<sup>25</sup> HORSBURGH, Nicola, JAVIER, Jordan, *Jihadist Subculture of Terrorism in Spain*, International Policy Institute, War Studies Group, King's College, London

<sup>26</sup> We are aware that a (potential) radical may be either male or female. However, for the purpose of this report, we will refer to these individuals as males.

<sup>27</sup> GAMMELL, Caroline, *Britain's youngest teenage terrorist: 'a wake-up call for parents'*, Telegraph, 17 september 2008

<sup>28</sup> ROY, Olivier, *Al Qaeda in the West as a Youth Movement : The power of a narrative*, CEPS Policy Brief, August 2008

<sup>29</sup> HUSAIN, Fatima, O'BRIEN, Margaret, *Muslim Communities in Europe: Reconstruction and Transformation*, Current Sociology.2000; pp. 1-13



territory where they are operating. However, this can represent a significant number of people and the existence of youth organizations close to the terrorist groups allows for a continuous flow of recruits. For instance the violent urban youth movement *Kale Borroka* is used as a gate and workforce reservoir for the ETA<sup>30</sup>. In addition to that, the Basque militants benefit from the passive support of a significant minority of the population (the third circle).

The ideological groups have a revolutionary mindset: their aim is to create a massive upheaval around the world so as to create a new social order. The pool of potential recruits depends on the attractiveness of the ideology and of the global context. For instance, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, leftist groups lost an appealing model (as well as logistical support) and their ideology became less attractive. Contrary to nationalist-separatist groups, they do not benefit from a “natural” pool of recruits and have to devote resources to attract new members.

Al Qaeda members’ mindset depends on their locations, in that very different groups use the same general franchise. Organizations in North Africa and the Middle East, which decided to join the movement, are merely reinterpreting a local conflict in global terms to gain publicity, influence and in some cases logistical support. Individuals creating cells in Western countries tend to see themselves as part of the *Ummah*, which they are defending against a perceived general aggression of the West. The pool of potential recruits in the Middle East and North Africa seems to be limited to radical individuals, who are not already engaged with groups having a purely local agenda. In this regard when conflicts in the Middle East are replaced in a local context and when local leaders are offering political options, Al Qaeda suffers massive setbacks. This was for instance the case in Iraq.

The pool of potential recruits in Western Europe is made of individuals buying into Al Qaeda’s narrative and ready to engage in violent activities in the name of this narrative. A more specific profiling is very difficult to achieve. In this regard Peter Nesser provides an interesting typology of terrorist cell members in Europe. Aside the figure of the entrepreneur, “the crucial person who establishes and ‘manages’ a terrorist cell [and] recruits his accomplice”<sup>31</sup> distinguishes three other general profiles: the protégé, the misfit and the drifter. Judging by the broadness of the different categories, this typology tends to show that the pool of potential recruits for a gifted entrepreneur is fairly important.

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<sup>30</sup> THIBAUD, Cécile, *Le sang neuf d’ETA*, L’express, 21 December 2000

[http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/monde/europe/le-sang-neuf-d-eta\\_493163.html](http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/monde/europe/le-sang-neuf-d-eta_493163.html)

<sup>31</sup> NESSER, Peter, *How does radicalization occur in Europe?*, Presentation given at the Second Inter-Agency Radicalization Conference, hosted by U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Washington DC, July 10, 2006  
[http://www.mil.no/multimedia/archive/00080/DHS\\_foredrag\\_80480a.pdf](http://www.mil.no/multimedia/archive/00080/DHS_foredrag_80480a.pdf)



*Nature of the places of socialization for the groups' members*

For national separatist groups places for socialization are numerous, well established within the community and operating in the open. For instance, in addition to well-known bars sympathetic to the Basque cause, a network of entities covering different domains of the society surrounds the ETA, such as LAB (Trade Union), *Askatasuna* (prisoner's family and defence), *Egizan* (Women), *Eguzki* (environment) *Ikasle Abertzaleak* (students) and *Askapena* and *Xaki* (International action)<sup>32</sup>.

For leftist radical groups, the socialization places are not as numerous and most of the time related to political activities. Not surprisingly legal radical leftist political groups or informal protest movements played an important role in allowing radical like-minded people to meet.

In the case of jihadists the most intuitive places for socialization would be radical mosques and political lectures by radical imams. However as these places and type of events are currently closely monitored by the European intelligence services, they tend to be used only to spot potential recruits. The actual radicalization then occurs in other places, which are not necessarily linked to extreme religious views. As the House of Commons report on the 2005 bombings in London underlines: *"A common factor for all 3 – Khan, Tanweer and Hussain – was the social life around the mosques, youth clubs, gyms and Islamic bookshop in Beeston. [...] Camping, canoeing, white-water rafting, paintballing and other outward bound type activities are of particular interest because they appear common factors for the 7 July bombers and other cells disrupted previously and since."*<sup>33</sup>

It is not clear to what extent these activities played a role in the radicalization process. In any case it seems that for jihadist groups, contrary to nationalist-separatist groups, the recruitment of new members or the constitution of a self-starter cell do not necessarily occur in places ideologically linked to the cause. It would appear that the violent radical Islamists views are "often disseminated through personal mentors and at private locations<sup>34</sup>." In other words radicalization does not occur in the open in dedicated places, but rather through social networking. This is due to the lack of a wide support base (third circle) for such movement within the general society.

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<sup>32</sup> 2003 co-authored with Mary Kaldor (2003) Diego Muro 'Religious and Nationalist Militant Groups' in Helmut Anheier, Marlies Glasius & Mary Kaldor (eds.) Global Civil Society Yearbook 2003, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 151-184.

<http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/Publications/Yearbooks/2003/2003Chapter7e.pdf>

<sup>33</sup> *Report of the official account of the bombings in London on 7th July 2005*, House of Commons 2006

<sup>34</sup> TANKEL, Stephen, *Countering Violent Extremism, Lessons from the Abrahamic faiths*, East-West institute Research Report, p. 58, October 2007



It should also be noted that European prisons are also places for radicalization and recruitment of violent radicals<sup>35</sup>.

#### 4.1.4. Objectives

**Relevance of the following criteria to develop counter-actions:**

**Nature and scope of the claims/nature of the perceived enemy:** it is easier to deal with a group which has tangible claims and a precise perceived enemy than with groups having broad claims, some of them being intangible, and a long list of perceived enemies

##### *Nature and scope of the claims*

The claims of nationalist/separatist groups, although often considered unacceptable for states representatives, are limited in scope and tangible: they are related to a local context. The issues at stake are primarily the status (independence) of the territory over which the group is claiming jurisdiction plus some symbolic claims (language). Some groups, such as ETA, also have more ideological claims (leftist ideology) but this is not their primary objective.

Alternatively, violent radical left-wing groups usually have much broader and less tangible claims, regarding global politics and social order. Germany's Red Army Faction (RAF), the Red Brigades and Action Directe in France all had a revolutionary ideology: "They were against the state, against exploitation and for the interests of the working class [...] They were aiming for the revolutionary reorganization of society according to a Marxist-Leninist ideal<sup>36</sup>." The remaining splinter cells have strikingly similar claims, which cannot be considered to be limited and completely tangible.

In the case of Al Qaeda the claims also are broad. Some of them, although very hard to achieve, are more or less tangible (for instance the complete withdrawal of Western armies from what is perceived, rightly or wrongly so, as Muslim lands). However there is also an ideological dimension, in the sense that the violent radicals consider that there are fulfilling God's Will

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<sup>35</sup> MARRET, Jean-Luc, *Radicalisations et recrutements de l'islamisme radical dans l'Union européenne : l'exemple des prisons*, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS), 14 January 2006

<http://www.frstrategie.org/barreCompetences/terrorisme/20060114.pdf>

<sup>36</sup> Quoted in ROTTSCHEIDT, Ina, *Europe Compelled to Confront Left-Wing Terrorist Past*, Deutsche Welle, 14 February 2007

<http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,2347001,00.html>



through their actions. This dimension appears in the statement of Mohammad Sidique Khan, one of the perpetrators of the 2005 bombings in London:

“Our driving motivation doesn’t come from tangible commodities that this world has to offer. Our religion is Islam – obedience to the one true God, Allah, and following the footsteps of the final prophet and Messenger Mohammed...This is how our ethical stances are dictated. Your democratically elected governments continuously perpetuate atrocities against my people all over the world. And your support of them makes you directly responsible, just as I am directly responsible for protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters. Until we feel security, you will be our targets. And until you stop the bombing, gassing, imprisonment and torture of my people we will not stop this fight. We are at war and I am a soldier. Now you too will taste the reality of this situation.... I myself, I make du’a to Allah....to raise me amongst those whom I love like the prophets, the messengers, the martyrs and today’s heroes like our beloved Sheikh Osama Bin Laden, Dr. Ayman al- Zawahiri and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and all the other brothers and sisters that are fighting in...this cause<sup>37</sup>.”

In a nutshell the violent radical Islamist ideology builds on actual or perceived wrongs done to Muslim people. These wrongs are interpreted as a generalized Western attack against the Muslim community, the *Ummah*. At this stage a radical political interpretation of the Islamic faith is used as a justification to sanction all kinds of criminal acts. In this regard the claims are mostly intangible, as the ideological aspect leaves little room for compromise.

#### *Nature of the perceived enemy*

For nationalist/separatist groups the enemy is clearly defined, namely the state(s) refusing to grant independence/specific status to a given territory.

Radical leftist groups have a broader and less precise list of enemies, namely the “*enemies of the proletariat*”: such as politicians, military and law enforcement officials, business leaders and organizations (i.e. NATO). The Western general public *per se* is not defined as an enemy, but rather as masses, which need to be enlightened.

As for the violent radical Islamists groups they have an even broader list of enemies. According to the European Commission’s expert group on violent radicalisation “the Jihadist Salafist ideology legitimizes a twofold confrontational strategy by the inciters and perpetrators of violence which is aimed at states and societies with Muslim majorities stigmatized as ‘apostates’ and against non-

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<sup>37</sup> *Report of the official account of the bombings in London on 7th July 2005*, House of Commons 2006



Islamic countries depicted as ‘infidels’<sup>38</sup>.

These differences have an impact at the operational level. Whereas radical groups launch selective, symbolic and targeted attacks Al Qaeda is mostly responsible for indiscriminate bombings (which nonetheless have a symbolic dimension), resulting in massive civilian casualties in Europe as well as in the Middle East. This has something to do with the slightly different world visions of these groups. Radical leftist groups tend to divide the world in three parts: the revolutionaries (themselves), the state’s/economic order’s representatives (the enemy) and the general population (potential support for the revolution). For Al Qaeda the enemy, labelled as “*Western Crusaders and their supporters*”, corresponds to a much broader ensemble.

#### 4.1.5. Activities

Relevance of the following criteria to develop counter-actions:

- **Pattern of actions/range of methods:** a group with a pattern of action related to the political context and engaged in targeted actions, will be more likely to engage in political negotiations and make concessions than groups, which conduct indiscriminate attacks regardless the political context or than groups, which need to escalate their attacks to fulfil their objectives

#### *Pattern of actions*

Nationalist/separatist groups have a complex pattern of actions: their waves of attacks are closely related to the local context. That is, they observe a truce when negotiations with the governments are under way or they can adjust their degree of violence according to the public reaction to an attack. For instance after the 1987 bombing of a supermarket, which resulted in 21 deaths, ETA internally recognized that this kind of indiscriminate attack was counterproductive and changed its model of operations<sup>39</sup>.

Radical leftist groups have a different pattern of actions, as their aim is to create a state reaction that in return is supposed to trigger more support for their cause. In this regard they need to escalate their actions to try to increase support.

<sup>38</sup> European Commission's Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation, *Radicalisation Processes Leading to Acts of Terrorism*, 15 May 2008

[http://www.rikcoolsaet.be/files/art\\_ip\\_wz/Expert%20Group%20Report%20Violent%20Radicalisation%20FINAL.pdf](http://www.rikcoolsaet.be/files/art_ip_wz/Expert%20Group%20Report%20Violent%20Radicalisation%20FINAL.pdf)

<sup>39</sup> DE LA CALLE, Luis, SANCHEZ-CUENCA, Ignacio, Target Selection in the IRA and the ETA, July 2006



Al-Qaeda has no specific pattern of actions, as the hard core is not able to control and give specific instructions to self-starter cells. Attacks are generally planned at a time they will draw the maximum public attention and are likely to have an influence on high profile political events (national elections, international gatherings).

### *Range of methods*

The range of terrorist methods is very wide (bombings with advance warning, kidnapping or shooting of officials...). One could divide them in two categories: discriminate attacks and indiscriminate attacks. The first category refers to acts of terrorism, which are directed against a specific segment of the population. The second describes acts of terrorism, which hit the general population without consideration for the actual deeds/roles/political views of the victims.

We can then make a distinction between nationalist/separatist plus ideological groups and Al Qaeda. As L. Paul Bremer stated: “the Baader-Meinhoff gang in Germany, Action Directe in France, the Red Brigades in Italy all thought they had broad public support for their objectives. So these groups effectively constrained themselves in the kind of acts they would conduct<sup>40</sup>.” This seems to remain true nowadays. As Dr. Maria Alvanou argued: “The operational methodology and the tactics that the non-Islamist, non jihadist groups follow until now, seem to be very different from what the Global Jihad network employs for its hits. There are no ‘martyrdom’, suicide operations and in one aspect until now – there is the assumption that the attacks of the domestic, secular and leftist organizations are not as violent and deadly; at least in the sense that the targets chosen are not the mass public, but certain authority figures<sup>41</sup>”.

The same goes for nationalist/separatist groups: as a study on *Target selection in the IRA and ETA* reveals: “the weight of indiscriminate attacks is rather low in both organizations<sup>42</sup>”.

Al Qaeda-type terrorism stands out: most of its attacks consist of simultaneous indiscriminate bombings, which is the signature of the organization. This fundamental difference is due to the fact that contrary to other violent groups violent radical Islamist cells identified “the West” as their enemies and, therefore, do not differentiate groups of people within this vast group. Al Qaeda does not seek to generate public support in the West but of their fellow Muslims/Sunni.

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<sup>40</sup> BREMER, P.L.: *New Terrorist Threats and How to Counter Them*, The Heritage Foundation, Washington DC, 2000, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/hl678.cfm>

<sup>41</sup> ALVANOU, Maria, Dr., *Left wing terrorist groups in European countries: a threat still Alive*, ITSTIME/Italian Team for Security, Terroristic Issues & Managing Emergencies, May 2007, [http://www.itstime.it/Approfondimenti/Left\\_wing\\_terrorist.pdf](http://www.itstime.it/Approfondimenti/Left_wing_terrorist.pdf)

<sup>42</sup> DE LA CALLE, Luis, SANCHEZ-CUENCA, Ignacio, *Target Selection in the IRA and the ETA*, July 2006



They try to attract the maximum public attention for their cause, regardless the methods used in the process.

#### **4.2 The relevance of the typology to develop counter actions**

Drawing from these criteria we can conclude that distinguishing between leftist radical groups, nationalist separatist groups and religious groups is important to develop recommendations for actions. Indeed for most of the different criteria taken into account, there is a clear distinction between these three categories.

**Violent nationalist/separatist groups** could be defined as a group based on a specific territory and struggling, using terrorist tactics, in order to gain control of this specific territory. Their agenda can be broader (for instance ETA also has a leftist agenda) however the determining criterion is the fight for a specific territory; without that claim the group would not exist.

Such groups have a hierarchical structure and benefit from some support within the general population. They are not isolated organizations but are more or less related to social/youth/political institutions, which openly support at least some of their goals though some of them might not be comfortable with violent actions. There is a strong historical and familial dimension in their struggle in that the members of such groups are carrying on the fight for the cause of their elders.

**Violent radical leftist groups** can be defined as groups willing to obtain social change in one or several countries, according to a broad and not very well defined radical and leftist revolutionary agenda.

Such groups usually are smaller than nationalist-separatist groups and consist of one or several connected cells. They don't benefit from a "natural" pool of recruits and have to constantly attract new members to be able to pursue their activities. Contrary to nationalist separatist groups, most of the time radical leftist groups are fighting against "*their parents' society*". They do not benefit from the general public support and very few organizations agree with their objectives: in other words they are less embedded in the general society than nationalist separatist groups. As a consequence they are more vulnerable to infiltration and will have to deploy more efforts to act clandestinely.



**Violent radical Islamist groups** can be defined as groups, which are willing to achieve change on a global scale such as forcing Western states to review their foreign policy, bringing about regime change in the Middle East and reinstating the Caliphate in Muslim territories. They use a radical interpretation of the Islamic faith as a political means and as a justification for their violent actions.

Interestingly enough this typology also has an impact on the internal structure of the group. More precisely the goals of a group and the level of support they benefit from have an impact on its structural organization, which in turn has an impact of the range of methods available to this group to conduct operations.

**National separatists groups** have a hierarchical structure. As their goal is to gain control over a territory they have to make sure that they will be the only “legitimate rogue group” operating in this territory, which requires a specific ideology and strong internal organization. The division of labour at the organizational level has to be very specific and the command and control top-down and vertical. Such groups need to pay attention to the public reaction and will rarely engage in indiscriminate attacks. Their patterns of actions correspond to the local political context.

**Radical leftist groups** can be more loosely connected and have a network organization. Their aim is to raise awareness of the revolutionary cause and in this regard they will strike at symbolic targets, such as banks, military infrastructures or political officials. They aim at mobilizing more people to fight for the cause and are trying to provoke massive and repressive state reactions so as to mobilize new recruits. That is why they perceive the need to escalate their actions. However they will rarely engage in massive indiscriminate attacks so as to avoid antagonizing potential supports.

A global **radical Islamist movement**, seeking to reverse the global order, bring about regime change in several countries at a time and impose an exclusive and radical interpretation of the Islamic faith on a large scale, will by definition face several nation states reprisals at a time. That is why its survival requires a lack of affiliation with any specific territory, for a territorial base would be easily disrupted. Facing strong adversaries with armed forces (states) it cannot confront in a conventional war and having vast but still limited resources, such a group will need to have a very pragmatic and even opportunistic approach. That is the support of such or such local group completing its local agenda, or the endorsement of acts of terrorism perpetrated by individuals not or loosely connected to the leaders. Such a group is particularly dangerous because it might accept state help if that serves its global agenda but it is not controlled by any state. In other



words it has no reason to show any restraint in its activities and does not fear retaliation. There is nonetheless a significant drawback, which is the possibility of the movement being torn apart by incompatible tactics and some elements gaining too much independence.

The time dimension is very important. At first Al Qaeda was a hierarchically organized group. It then turned into a network organization, which allowed it to prepare the bombings of US embassies in Africa and 9/11. Nowadays the movement could be described as a “Dune organization”. Indeed “It is based more on a movement of constant flow and entrepreneurship rather than on determining a structural mode of action. It concentrates on creating and finding relative advantages and opportunities for action and then on moving on to other targets.<sup>43</sup>”. At the EU level the main threat stems from self-starter cells, which however rarely are in contact with the historical hard core. The latter nonetheless regularly sanctions the successful attacks from such cells, over which he exerts no operational control, on an opportunistic basis.

### **4.3 Graphics representation of the social embedding of different groups**

From the typology described in Section 4.2, one can propose three different graphics representing the social embedding of the three different types of terrorist groups. From these graphics general recommendations can be drawn to tackle radicalization at the group level.

Representing all the results of the typology in an easy-to-understand graphic way proved to be a challenging endeavour. In particular it seemed extremely difficult to represent all the above-mentioned criteria in a unique schema without ending up losing some clarity. That is why the analysis was concentrated on the representation of the social embedding of the different groups and their link to relevant social institutions

In this regard the most important part of the graphics is the yellow part, which symbolizes the size of support base of the different groups and the embedding of this support base within the general society. In a nutshell a vast support base means that the group has a large pool of potential recruits and is well embedded in the society. Alternatively, a very small yellow part represents the lack of connections of a given group to the general society.

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<sup>43</sup> MISHAL, Shaul, ROSENTHAL, Maoz, *Al Qaeda as a Dune Organization: Toward a Typology of Islamic Terrorist Organizations*, Department of Political Science, Tel Aviv University Tel Aviv, Israel, October 2004




Figure 3. Nationalist/separatist groups




Figure 4. Violent radical leftist groups today




Figure 5. Radical violent leftist groups in the 70's and the 80's




Figure 6. Radical violent Islamic groups



## 4.4 Typological implications for developing counteractions

This typology has an impact on the definition of counteractions at different levels. Three main levels for action were identified: political, social, law enforcement. For each group, drawing from the different aspects studied while building the typology, these three levels were prioritized.

### 4.4.1. Nationalist Separatist Groups

The pattern of action of nationalist-separatist groups is closely related to the local political context. This should to be the most important level to devise counteractions. This is all the more true since such groups tend to blend into the general society when at least some their grievances have been taken into account (IRA).

At the local level the militants must be encouraged to act through elected representatives. As they are strongly embedded in the general society a purely repressive approach will trigger strong resistance and is likely to reinforce the violent group.

At national level the state government should engage in talks with such groups to try to isolate the most radical elements from the mainstream movements. Some symbolic concessions might be necessary.

The following lessons, drawn from the conflict in Northern Ireland, might be relevant for the Basque conflict:

“Parties should be allowed to hold onto their dreams. No one demanded of Northern Ireland's Catholics that they let go of their hope for a united Ireland; no one required of local Protestants that they let go of their insistence that they remain a part of the United Kingdom.

They still have those goals, but they have agreed to pursue them exclusively through peaceful and democratic means. That is what matters.

Including in the political process those previously associated with violent groups can actually help. Sometimes it's hard to stop a war if you don't talk with those who are involved in it. <sup>44</sup>”

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<sup>44</sup> HAASS, Richard N., MITCHELL, George J., *Irish lessons for peace*, Common Ground News Service, 15 May 2007 <http://www.commongroundnews.org/article.php?id=20901&lan=en&sid=1&sp=0>



The EU level might be relevant for such groups as they are often very distrustful of Member States representatives and are active across Member States' territories. In this context the EU could appear as an honest broker and could encourage Member States to launch a comprehensive and ambitious peace process. The most relevant level for actions seems to be the political one.

#### **4.4.2. Leftist groups**

As for radical leftist groups, given the scope of their claims it proves very difficult to define actions at the political level. It is also doubtful that actions on the social level would prove effective, given that their social statuses are often not related to their political claims. The most relevant level for actions seems to be law enforcement.

#### **4.4.3 Jihadist Groups**

Jihadist groups do not benefit from a vast pool of natural recruits within the general EU society. This is the reason they constantly need to actively attract new members. In this regard social workers do have an important role to play in that they are the most likely to detect individuals going through a radicalization process that could lead them to violence.

As Tahir Abbas explained: “clearly, when we speak of Young Muslims who are involved or suspected of being involved in terrorist attacks, a great many do emerge from poor neighbourhoods, including ‘reverts’. However, a number do not. What these sets of people share in common are limited opportunities to engage with others in particular spheres, a lack of a sense of belonging and exclusion from mainstream politics.”<sup>45</sup>.

In this regard actions should be taken both at the national and local level aiming at providing opportunities and building bridges for people belonging to minorities, so as to allow them to be in more direct contact with the social activities of the majority.

As Bill Durodie put it: “Far from there being a layer of vulnerable young Muslims who are preyed upon by various hotheads, what we find, time and again, are passionate, intelligent and energetic individuals who somehow fail to find any meaning or purpose to their lives from within the confines of contemporary Western culture. Most of these are neither disconnected nor alienated

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<sup>45</sup> ABBAS, Tahir, *Muslim Minorities in Britain : Integration, Multiculturalism and radicalism in the Post-7/7 Period*, Journal of Intercultural Studies, Vol. 28, No. 3, August 2007 pp. 287-300



from society, and rather than being ‘radicalised’ from the outside, they actively look for something to join<sup>46</sup>.”

Various local associations or organizations offering peaceful ways to engage in politics or social issues should be supported and a general policy encouraging young people to join these associations should be enforced. A special emphasis should be put on supporting associations, which gather people from different social backgrounds.

A comprehensive policy, relying on parents, social workers, religious leaders and locals would prove even more effective. Indeed Christophe-Adji Ahoudian, Deputy Major in charge of youth in the 19th arrondissement in Paris gave an interesting example of a successful approach to deradicalization. In this neighbourhood a radical, styling himself “The Prophet”, was explaining to the youth that their duty was to go and fight the American troops in Iraq and trained them in military techniques.

“At this stage, social workers went to see the parents whose children had left for Iraq, convincing them to help integrate these young men into the local community. They set up committees to bring the different religious leaders together, offered social and vocational integration, and helped them to find employment (they noted that ‘the Prophet’ did not leave for Iraq as he had a job).

One crucial element was to work with these young men’s mothers, said Mr. Ahoudian, and a successful group was established to bring together mothers from the district. As a result of all these measures, this group of young radicals has ceased to exist<sup>47</sup>.”

Such an approach cannot be applied to nationalist separatist groups for the young militants feel they are carrying on the mission of the elders and most of their social environment is supporting the cause in one way or another. For violent radical jihadist groups the most relevant level for actions seems to be the social one.

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<sup>46</sup> DURODIE, Bill, *Why ‘deradicalisation’ is not the answer*, Spiked, 5 June 2008, <http://www.spiked-online.com/index.php?site/article/5229/>

<sup>47</sup> AHOUDIAN, Christophe-Adji, *Countering youth radicalisation: what works, what doesn’t*, European Policy Centre Event Report, 3 November 2008  
<http://www.epc.eu/en/er1.asp?TYP=ER&LV=293&PG=ER%2FEN%2Flisting%5Fer%5Fall08&MENU=sub&t=2&file=S&see=y&offset=10>



#### 4.5 Where to act (priorities for action)

Regarding the previous analysis, we have identified 3 levels of counter radicalisation:

- Political
- Social
- Law enforcement

Regarding the 3 typologies of groups (Nationalists, Leftists, Jihadists), we have analysed how it was possible for public authorities to interact with them.

We then fixed a priority for each groups at the 3 levels (from 1 to 3)

	Political level	Social Level	Law enforcement level
Nationalist/Separatist Groups	1	2	3
Radical leftist groups	3	2	1
Jihadist groups	3	1	2

Levels of priority (per type of organization, from 1 to 3)

1 = High

2 = Medium

3 = Low



## **5. The process model: *How do individuals in groups radicalise?***

In the previous chapter we described typologies of violent radical groups. These typologies are relevant in creating awareness among professionals who work with radicals. Within country borders, the violent radical groups are mostly known. For the sake of the European Union a general knowledge or awareness needs to be developed in order to share information on for example best practices. The typologies give an overview of “who” the radical groups in the European Union are. The process model of radicalisation, outlined in this chapter, describes “how” these groups can radicalise. This insight supports the development of intervention guidelines, which can be applied to specific aspects of the process of radicalisation.

In this chapter we describe a conceptual process model of how individuals radicalise in groups. It should be noted that this general model is focused on organized radical groups (like IRA, ETA and Al Qaeda), and does not cover ‘bunch of guys’-groups (like the Hofstad group and the Hamburg cell). Furthermore, we want to emphasize that the model we present is a general model covering parts of the radicalisation process that are most often present and that the model primarily focuses on psychological processes.

The process model that we describe in this chapter is based on a literature study in which we surveyed different existing models that try to unravel the complex process of radicalisation. An overview of all of the models can be found in Section 5.1.

In Section 5.2 we give a graphical presentation of the theoretical process model of radicalisation and describe the contents. The process model is based on the literature study, after which it was discussed in multiple workshops with international radicalisation experts.

An overview of conclusions and recommendations for further research can be found in Section 5.3.



## 5.1 Existing process models of radicalisation

Different models exist that try to unravel the complex process of radicalisation. In its broadest sense, one may state that involvement in radicalisation or terrorism comprises three seemingly distinct phases: becoming involved, being involved (synonymous with engaging in unambiguous terrorist activity) and disengaging<sup>48</sup>. However, this is a very broad distinction which does not capture a detailed description of what may happen in these phases. Other models are a bit more specific, and will be described below. We make a distinction between three categories of models: (1) general models, (2) models that are based on social movement theory, and (3) models that are specifically developed to understand Islam-radicalisation and terrorism.

### 5.1.1. General Models

Borum<sup>49</sup> has identified four observable (behavioural) stages that appear to frame a process of ideological development common to many individuals and groups of diverse ideological backgrounds. In the first stage, an extremist individual or group identifies some type of undesirable event or condition (“it’s not right”) that may be economic or social. In the second phase, the extremist individual or group frames the undesirable condition as an “injustice”; that is, the condition does not apply to everyone (“it’s not fair”). Third, because injustice generally results from transgressive (wrongful) behaviour, extremists hold a person or group responsible (“it’s your fault”), identifying a potential target. Finally, in the fourth phase, the extremist individual or group deems the person or group responsible for the injustice as “bad” (“you’re evil”). An advantage of Borum’s process model is the focus on an understanding of behaviour, not just ideology. By using a framework to organize behavioural information, counterterrorist analysis and threat assessments can become more accurate and more sophisticated.

We will now give an overview of different researchers and the general models on radicalisation they have developed:

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<sup>48</sup> Horgan, J. (2008). From profiles to pathways and roots to routes; Perspectives from psychology on radicalization into terrorism. *ANNALS, AAPSS*, 618, 80-94.

<sup>49</sup> Borum, R. (2003) Understanding the terrorist mindset. *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, 72, 7-10.



### *Dalgaard-Nielsen on the path towards terrorism*

In her review article, Dalgaard-Nielsen<sup>50</sup> states that different authors identify different stages on the path toward terrorism. In general, such stages might comprise:

1. Identifying a problem as not just a misfortune, but as an *injustice*.
2. Constructing a moral justification of violence (religious, ideological, political)
3. *Blaming* the victims (“it is their own fault”).
4. *Dehumanizing* the victims through language and symbols.
5. Displacing responsibility (God or other authorities ordered the individual to commit the act of violence) or diffusing responsibility (the group, not the individual is responsible).
6. Misconstruing or minimizing the harmful effects (by using euphemisms or by contrasting to other acts which are worse).

Dalgaard-Nielsen further mentions that the process of radicalisation does not entail an alteration of the personality structure or of moral standards. Instead, the readiness to kill comes about through a cognitive restructuring of the value of killing. Whether group dynamics alone can turn a normal person into a terrorist or whether it would be necessary to study the interaction between group processes and individual predispositions is still an ongoing debate.

### *Stahelski's 5 phases of conditioning*

Sociologists and psychologists have discovered that terrorist groups use cult like conditioning techniques to convert normal individuals to remorseless killers. Stahelski<sup>51</sup> describes five stages of conditioning. All conditioning phases are supported by powerful group dynamics that reinforce the effectiveness of the conditioning. Terrorism researchers have compared terrorist groups to cults, and they have concluded that this is a valid comparison.

The first of the five phases is called De-pluralisation. In this phase people fulfil their affiliative needs by belonging to a variety of groups. Terrorist groups want to change this normal pluralized state by de-pluralising potential joiners. Cults cannot effectively condition a joiner unless the cult group is the joiner's only group affiliation, so they try to isolate the potential joiner. After cult groups are successful in isolating a potential joiner, the completely dependent individual is then willing to do whatever it takes to retain membership in the group. De-pluralising can occur via several pathways over varying amounts of time. Now, the joiner is more vulnerable for Phase 2.

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<sup>50</sup> Dalgaard-Nielsen (2008). Studying violent radicalization in Europe II. The potential contribution of socio psychological approaches. DIIS working paper no 2008/3DIIS.

<sup>51</sup> Stahelski, A. (2004). Terrorists are made, not born: Creating terrorists using social psychological conditioning. University of California.



The second phase called self de-individuation is about taking away someone's personal identity, both externally and internally. For example, joiners give up their civilian clothes and are then given uniforms to wear. They are expected to give up values, beliefs, attitudes or behaviour patterns that deviate from the group values. De-individuated persons stop thinking about their own unique qualities. They absorb the concept that they are simply anonymous parts or the greater whole.

In Phase 3 called other de-individuation the categorization process in which people define "us" and "them" takes place. Cults take this usually normal categorization process a step further by identifying certain outgroups as enemies. In practice, this means giving up any personal relationships with enemy group members, not mentioning individual names, attributes or characteristics. All enemies become homogeneous.

Phase 4 is named Dehumanization. All positive characteristics are attributed to members of the ingroup and all negative characteristics are attributed to members of the outgroup. Dehumanization happens when these negative characteristics are associated with nonhuman entities, such as animals, filth and germs. Cult members are encouraged to use these labels when referring to the enemy.

And finally, Phase 5, demonisation. This process occurs when cult members become convinced that the enemy is in league with the devil and cosmic evil. Demonization is a widely available conditioning strategy. Referring to the United States as the great Satan is an example of cultural demonization. Demonizing is simply channelled and intensified by terrorist groups.

Stahelski further mentions that the five phases are reinforced by obedience pressure which would not exist without the presence of the charismatic leader.

### *Moghaddam's staircase to terrorism*

According to Moghaddam<sup>52</sup>, terrorism can be best understood through a focus on the psychological interpretation of material conditions and the options seen to be available to overcome perceived injustices, particularly those in the procedures through which decisions are made. Moghaddam uses the metaphor of a narrowing staircase leading to the terrorist act at the top of a building. The fundamentally important feature of the situation is not only the actual

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<sup>52</sup> Moghaddam, F. M. (2005). The staircase to terrorism: a psychological explanation. *American Psychologist* 60, 161-169.



number of floors, stairs, rooms and so on, but the way people perceive the building and the doors they think are open to them. As individuals climb the staircase, they see fewer and fewer choices, until the only possible outcome is the destruction of others, or oneself, or both. The staircase metaphor is intended to provide a general framework within which to organize current psychological knowledge and is not intended as a formal model to be tested against alternatives.

On the ground floor perceptions of fairness (or injustice) and feelings of relative deprivation dominate. Deprivation can be egoistical deprivation (deprivation within a group) and fraternal deprivation (deprivation between groups). Fraternal deprivation appears to be a better predictor of discontentment, possibly resulting in feelings that a groups' path has been blocked to a desired goal, which their group deserves and others possess. Perceptions of injustice may arise for a variety of reasons including economic and political conditions and threats to personal or collective identity. Perceived threat to identity is of central importance. The concept of "perception" in this sense is crucial, because no matter how the situation is objectively, perception is what makes the difference and what determines someone's feelings.

Those who reach the first floor are trying to find solutions that will make their feelings experienced on the ground floor disappear. Two psychological factors shape their behaviour on the first floor: 1) perceived possibilities for personal mobility and improvement of the situation, and 2) perceptions of procedural justice. If they do not see possibilities for individual mobility and do not feel that they can adequately influence (or participate in) the procedures through which decisions are made, they will keep climbing up the stairs. Those who vehemently blame "others" for their perceived problems will climb the stairs to the second floor.

The second floor is focused on the displacement of aggression. The idea that at least some acts of terrorism involve displacement of aggression is well known.<sup>53</sup> The displacement of aggression has been channelled through direct and indirect support for institutions and organizations that nurture authoritarian attitudes and extremist behaviour. This includes educational systems that encourage rigid, us-versus-them thinking and fanatical movements. Individuals who develop a readiness to physically displace aggression and who actively seek out opportunities to do so eventually leave the second floor and climb more steps of the staircase to try to take action against perceived enemies.

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<sup>53</sup> Freud, S. (1955). Group psychology and the analysis of the ego. In: Moghaddam, F. M. (2005). The staircase to terrorism: a psychological explanation. *American Psychologist* 60, 161-169. (Original work published in 1921)

Miller, N., Pederson, W. C., Earlywine, M. & Pollock, V., E. (2003). A Theoretical model of triggered displaced aggression. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 7, 75-97.



The third floor is called moral engagement. Terrorist organizations arise as a parallel or shadow world, with a parallel morality that justifies the struggle to achieve the ideal society by any means possible. Recruits are persuaded through tactics such as isolation, affiliation, secrecy and fear. Terrorist organizations become effective by positioning themselves at two levels: (1) the macro level, as the only option open toward reforming society, and (2) the micro level, as a home for disaffected individuals. The most important transformation is a gradual engagement with the morality of terrorist organizations; individuals begin to see terrorism as a justified strategy. When they become more fully engaged, they climb the stairs further.

On the fourth floor, recruitment takes place and, if successfully, a person will join the terrorist organization. After a person has entered the secret world of the terrorist organization, there is little or no opportunity to exit alive. During training they will further develop their “us-versus-them” feelings and see the terrorist organization as legitimate. Often it is informal friendship networks and a need to belong that binds individuals to such cells.<sup>54</sup> “Us-versus-them” feelings become stronger through self-categorization processes. In addition, commitment grows stronger because conformity and obedience are important within group standards. The individual members are now part of a tightly controlled group from which they cannot exit alive.

On the fifth floor specific individuals are selected and trained to sidestep inhibitory mechanisms that could prevent them from injuring and killing both others and themselves, and those selected are equipped and sent to carry out terrorist acts. The somewhat military training is made possible by two psychological processes that are central to intergroup dynamics:<sup>55</sup> (1) social categorization (of civilians as part of the outgroup) and (2) psychological distance (through exaggerating differences between in and outgroup). It is these two processes that make individual members of terrorist organizations able to kill people.

### ***5.1.2. Models based on Conversion / Social Movement Theory***

Social movement theory (SMT; including the Lofland and Stark conversion model) has been used by different authors to create a framework for studying different stages in the radicalisation process<sup>56</sup>. The theory seems suitable in answering questions like: “why do individuals join radical movements?” by assuming that, at the heart of decisions about joining, is a process of persuasion.

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<sup>54</sup> Sageman, M. (2004). *Understanding terror networks*. Pennsylvania: university of Pennsylvania Press.

<sup>55</sup> Brown, R. & Gaertner, S. L. (eds). (2002). *Worlds in collision: terror and the future global order*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

<sup>56</sup> Inaba, K. (2004). Conversion to new religious movements; Reassessment of Lofland/Skonovd conversion motifs and Lofland/Stark conversion process. Japan, Kobe University.



Individuals often experience an extensive socialization process that includes exposure to movement ideas, debate and deliberation, even experimentation with alternative groups. This is consistent with the finding of SMT researchers in the 1980's and 1990's who discovered that the primary task of any organization or movement is to maintain its own survival<sup>57</sup>. This requires that its adherents/members collect and maintain a body of supporters. Social Movement Theory identifies four key processes that enhance the likelihood that a potential joiner will be drawn to, for example, a radical Islamic group and eventually persuaded to participate. As with Lofland and Stark's "value added" model of conversion, these processes can be conceptualized as elements of a funnel that systematically reduces the number of persons who can be considered available for recruitment, and also increasingly specifies who is available. Conversion is defined as a process of religious change which transforms "the way the individual perceives the rest of society and his or her personal place in it, altering one's view of the world." The Lofland and Stark<sup>58</sup> conversion model encompasses two theories that originate from social psychology. The first theory is "strain theory", according to which people join a religion in order to satisfy conventional desires that unusual personal or collective deprivations have frustrated. The second theory is "social influence theory", which assumes that people join a religion because they have formed social attachments with persons who are already members and because their attachments to non-members are weak.

We will now give an overview of researchers and their version of the process of radicalisation bases on SMT.

#### *Borum and Wiktorowicz 4 stages of radicalisation*

The literature<sup>59</sup> shows that those who came to be radicalised first revealed an openness to new worldviews (*cognitive opening*), then came to view religion as a path to find meaning (*religious seeking*), eventually they found the group's narrative and ethos to "make sense" (*frame alignment*), and ultimately, through a process of *socialization*, became fully indoctrinated into the movement. More specifically, these four stages can be described as follows:

1. **Cognitive opening:** An individual becomes receptive to the possibility of new ideas and worldviews. Most individuals will at first reject the movement as radical, or irrational. However, a crisis can produce a cognitive opening. The specific crisis varies across

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<sup>57</sup> Zald, M. McCarthy, J. (1987). *Social movements in an organizational society*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction books.

<sup>58</sup> Lofland, J. & Stark, R. (1993). Conversion Motifs. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 20, 373-385.

<sup>59</sup> Borum, R. (2003) Understanding the terrorist mindset. *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, 72, 7-10.

Wiktorowicz, Q. (2004). Joining the cause: Al-Muhajiroun and radical islam. *Journal for the scientific study of religion*. Forthcoming.



individuals. But there are common types: economic (losing job etc.), social/cultural (humiliation, racism), political (repression, torture, political discrimination) and personal (death in family, crime victimization).

2. Religious seeking: the individual seeks meaning through a religious idiom. Where an individual's identity is in part tied to religion, a cognitive opening may lead to religious seeking. This may not always be the case, but prior socialization and sense of self most likely influence the direction of seeking. Religious seeking takes two forms: individuals may look into religion more deeply and/or members in the movement can foster "guided religious seeking". A potential joiner can shop around and sample different religious products while a movement member subtly guides him toward the conclusion that the movement's ideology is the most reasonable and appealing choice.
3. Frame alignment: the public representation proffered by the radical group makes sense to the seeker and attracts his initial interest. A willingness to listen and contemplate alternative ways of viewing the world, does not automatically lead to joining. But, because the seeker is typically a relative novice in the religion, he does not command the knowledge to effectively judge the theoretical merits of competing religious perspectives, and as a result is most likely to satisfy. This choice is in turn contingent upon whether the movement achieves frame alignment with the views of the seeker. This leads many movements to initially focus on local, immediate concerns or emotional issues.
4. Socialisation: Once frame alignment is achieved, deeper socialization processes can take place. The individual experiences religious lessons and activities that facilitate indoctrination, identity construction and value changes. The individual becomes an active learner. Movements foster identity construction (or reconstruction) and encourage social bonds that facilitate joining by creating a new social network and solidarity to encourage individuals to stay the course and continue training. At a certain point an individual will internalize much of the ideology, and formal joining becomes a natural progression. Once an individual chooses to become a member, instruction is directed toward training the new adherent as a leader, organizer, and/or participant in movement activities intended to reproduce the movement message and attract the new followers.

### *Inaba's 7 stage model of radicalisation*

Inaba<sup>60</sup> uses a slightly other version of the Lofland/Stark conversion model that distinguishes seven stages. In these stages, a person must:

1. experience enduring and acutely-felt tensions (Tension)

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<sup>60</sup> Inaba, K. (2004). Conversion to new religious movements; Reassessment of Lofland/Skonovd conversion motifs and Lofland/Stark conversion process. Japan, Kobe University.



2. within a religious problem-solving perspective (Religious problem-solving perspective)
3. which results in self-designation as a religious seeker, (Seekership)  
and the prospective convert must
4. encounter the movement or cult at a turning point in life (Turning point)
5. wherein an affective bond is formed with one or more converts (Affective bond)
6. where extra-cult attachments are absent or neutralized (Weak extra-cult attachments)  
and
7. where the convert is exposed to intensive interaction to become an active and dependable adherent (Intensive interaction).

The Lofland/Stark model is divided into two categories: predisposing conditions (stage 1, 2, and 3) and situational contingencies (stage 4, 5, 6, and 7). Predisposing conditions are attributes of potential converts, and the situational contingencies turn a potential convert into an actual convert. The predisposing conditions are personal attributes before the pre-converts encounter radical movements. Reasons why converts become more involved in radical movements are (often) primarily the quality of the relationship with members, and the friendship shown to them by existing members.

### ***5.1.3. Models focussed on Islam, Jihadi's***

Salafi-Jihadi radicalisation can be considered as a “continuum” of a system spanning an individual’s initial embrace of the Salafi-Jihadi worldview to the subsequent legitimization of violence and its commission. Different authors have given suggestions to describe the stages within this continuum. We will now give an overview of these phases.

Taarnby’s phases of Islamic radicalisation.

Michael Taarnby’s<sup>61</sup> depiction of the “phases” that preceded the Hamburg cell’s decision to stage the 11 September 2001 attacks covers the multifunctional nature of Salafi-Jihadi ideology within the radicalisation process by using the following stages:

- Individual alienation and marginalization
- Spiritual quest
- Process of radicalisation
- Meeting and associating with like-minded people (socialization)
- Gradual seclusion and cell formation
- Acceptance of violence

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<sup>61</sup> Taarnby, M. (2005). Recruitment of islamist terrorists in Europe. Trends and perspectives. Research report funded by the Danish Ministry of Justice.



- Connection with a gatekeeper (a militant connected to a terrorist network)
- Going operational

These processes reflect important phases of ideology's function within the Salafi-Jihadi radicalisation and "activation" process and are supported by data Sageman gathered on hundreds of Salafi-Jihadis.

### *Cozzens General Ideological Model*

Cozzens<sup>62</sup> has introduced a "general ideological model", that is a generalization and expansion of Taarnby's phases of radicalisation. The model more explicitly highlights the function of ideology while adding a further layer of analysis to capture its ability to shape jihadi violence and legitimize it after the fact. The triangle represents ideology's role in shaping the increasingly focused and personal phases of radicalization leading to jihadi violence. Where Salafi-Jihadi ideology functions to interpret the myriad ills facing the Muslim world, the greatest number of ideological mediums and modes of communication are found. The function of these passive, nonviolent mediums to purvey an exclusive ideology is analogous to a farmer tilling fertilized soil, then forgetting his work: inevitably weeds will germinate given time and "favourable" conditions. At the second and third levels – separation and obligation – ideology is disseminated through a much narrower and targeted, or "active" means, often on a personal and "cell" level. Ideology is conveyed and reinforced at the fourth level – activation – through both passive mediums and face-to-face contact. It is at this point in the model where the number of ideological mediums likely begin to increase, reflective of both "jihadi culturing" leading up to an operation as well as the individual's self-interest in pursuing the rewards of jihad (martyrdom being the ultimate example). The nature of mediums likely shifts slightly in this phase as attention is re-focused from group peers to mediums of religious assurance, guidance, and inspiration, whether active or passive. Concerning the defence and legitimization of jihadi violence, all of the above mediums apply, from the passive to the active.

### *Silber and Bhatt's 4 stages of Islamic radicalisation*

An assessment of the various reported models of radicalization leads Silber and Bhatt<sup>63</sup> to the conclusion that the radicalisation process is composed of four distinct phases, namely (1) pre-radicalisation, (2) self-identification, (3) indoctrination, and (4) jihadization. Stage 1, pre-radicalisation, describes an individuals' world (e.g., pedigree, lifestyle, religion, social status,

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<sup>62</sup> Cozzens, J. B. (2006). Identifying entry points of action in counter radicalization: Countering Salafi-Jihadi ideology through developing initiatives – strategic openings. DISS. Working paper no 2006/6.

<sup>63</sup> Silber, M. D. & Bhatt, A. (2007). Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat. NYPD.



neighbourhood and education) just prior to their journey down the path of radicalisation. Despite the absence of a psychological profile of a likely candidate for radicalisation, there is commonality among a variety of demographic, social, and psychological factors that make individuals more vulnerable to the radical message. For example, one may think of the *environment* (e.g., the demographic make-up of a country, state, city, or town plays a significant role in providing the fertile ground for the introduction and growth of the radicalisation process), or the *candidates* (e.g., individuals, who are attracted to radical thought, usually live, work, play, and pray within these enclaves of ethnic, Muslim communities. Their gender, age, family's social status, stage in life, as well as psychological factors, all affect vulnerability to radicalization).

In stage two, self-identification, which is largely influenced by both internal and external factors, marks the point where the individual begins to explore Salafi Islam, while slowly migrating away from their former identity. The catalyst for this “religious seeking” is often a cognitive event, or crisis, which challenges one's certitude in previously held beliefs, opening the individual's mind to a new perception or view of the world. Some of the crises that can jumpstart this phase may be *economic* (e.g., losing a job, blocked mobility), *social* (e.g., alienation, discrimination, racism), *political* (e.g., international conflicts involving Muslims) or *personal* (e.g., death in the close family). Political and personal conflicts are often the cause of this identity crisis. A personal crisis such as the death of a family member, a turn to religion as a means to deal with life crises and disappointment, for atoning for past transgressions, and loneliness are all examples of personal conflicts with which many Western-based terrorists struggled. The key influences during this phase of conflict and “religious seeking” include trusted social networks made up of friends and family, religious leaders, literature and the Internet. Given the high volume, popularity, and almost “faddish” nature of the extremist agenda, an individual who goes searching for answers will invariably be exposed to a plethora of Salafi/Wahhabi interpretations of Islam. Ultimately, the individual is alienated from his former life and affiliates with like-minded individuals, who, via small group dynamics, strengthen his dedication to Salafi Islam.

Importantly, this phase is characterized by a self-selection process by which individuals first join a group that then becomes radicalised. Personal crises often compel these individuals to seek out other like-minded individuals, who may be experiencing the same inner conflict.

Two key indicators within this self-identification stage that suggest progression along the radicalisation continuum are 1) progression or gravitation towards Salafi Islam, and 2) regular attendance at a Salafi mosque. As individuals adopt Salafism, typical signatures include becoming alienated from one's former life, affiliating with like-minded individuals, joining or



forming a group of like-minded individuals in a quest to strengthen one's dedication to Salafi Islam, giving up cigarettes, drinking, gambling and Western dress, wearing traditional Islamic clothing, growing a beard, and becoming involved in social activism and community issues related to the Islamic community.

Indoctrination is the (third) stage in which an individual progressively intensifies his beliefs, wholly adopts Salafi-Jihadi ideology and concludes, without question, that the conditions and circumstances exist where action is required to support and further the Salafist cause. That action is militant jihad. A "spiritual sanctioner" plays a leading role in this phase of radicalization. The key aspect of this stage is the *acceptance of a religious-political worldview* that justifies, legitimizes, encourages, or supports violence against anything *kufir*, or un-Islamic, including the West, its citizens, its allies, or other Muslims whose opinions are contrary to the extremist agenda. Rather than seeking and striving for the more mainstream goals of getting a good job, earning money, and raising a family, the indoctrinated radical's goals are non-personal and focused on achieving "the greater good."

Two key indicators within this indoctrination stage are 1) withdrawal from the Mosque, and 2) politicization of new beliefs. Global events are now perceived through this newly found extremist ideological lens. The world for these individuals becomes divided into two sides: the enlightened believers (themselves) and the unbelievers (everybody else). Signatures of this phase are joining a group of like-minded extremists that help facilitate the individual's continued departure from the secular world and all the things it represents (group members become their new family), and holding meetings and discussions with an increasingly radical agenda in more private settings.

As individuals progress through the indoctrination phase, they most likely have already sought, found and bonded with other like-minded individuals. This loosely knit but cohesive group of people forms a cluster — an alliance based on social, psychological, ideological, and ethnic commonalities.

In this the fourth phase, Jihadisation, members of the cluster accept their individual duty to participate in jihad, and self-designate themselves as holy warriors or mujahedeen. Ultimately, the group will begin operational planning for jihad or a terrorist attack. These "acts in furtherance" will include planning, preparation and execution. By the jihadisation phase, small group dynamics play a much more prominent role. Individuals see themselves as part of a movement and group loyalty becomes paramount above all other relationships. "Groupthink" in this stage becomes a force multiplier for radicalisation and invariably paves the way for action. If



an attack is a group objective, the next step will include target selection and operational planning. Although the commitment to accept jihad is an individual choice, the decision to attack is made as a group and the actual attack is conducted by the group. It is critical to note that while the other stages of radicalisation may take place, gradually, over two to three years, the jihadisation stage — the stage which defines the actual attack — can occur quickly, and with very little warning. In some cases, this stage runs its course in as little as a couple of weeks. The jihadisation stage contains many sub-stages (see below), all of which usually occur, but not necessarily sequentially.

- Travelling abroad: The travel may be to a militant training camp, or, for those seeking religious justification, attending a religious retreat.
- Training/Preparation: Prior to launching the attack, many of the clusters have participated in some form of group training and preparation that includes “*outward bound*”-like activities (e.g., camping, white-water rafting, paintball games, target shooting, and outdoor simulations of military-like manoeuvres) and *mental reinforcement activities* (e.g., extremist websites, chatrooms, blogs, Jihadist videos and tapes, and drafting a last will and testament or making a pre-suicide video).
- Attack planning: Once a cluster or group decides to conduct an attack, they begin conducting research while holding secretive tactical group discussions on targets, the mode of attack, the operational scenario (date and time), and the role of each group member. This sub-stage includes several indicators, such as researching on the Internet, reconnaissance/surveillance, (drawing maps, videotaping targets, and staking out target areas) and acquiring materiel/developing the device.

The ultimate stage of jihadisation is the actual attack. By this time, all the potential pre-emptive indicators have expired. The terrorists have attained both intention and capability and the chances for law enforcement and intelligence to thwart or prevent an attack are extremely low.

It is important to note that each of the phases described above is unique and has specific signatures. All individuals who begin this process do not necessarily pass through all of the stages; many stop or abandon the process at different points, and although this model is sequential, individuals do not always follow a perfectly linear progression. Finally, individuals who do pass through this entire process are quite likely to be involved in the planning or implementation of a terrorist act.



### *Sageman on joining jihad.*


Sageman<sup>64</sup> (2005) states that joining jihad is a bottom up activity. For example, Al Qaeda has no top down recruitment program. He describes different stages and the religious ideological contribution is an important factor. The script, stressing the justice and fairness of the original Muslim community, appeals to gifted young men who are excluded from the higher rewards of society. Combined with natural group processes, it transforms their values to conform to those of their ever-closer friends. Women play a critical role in this process. They provide the invisible infrastructure of the jihad. As influential parts of the social movement, they often encourage their relatives and friends to join the jihad. And once in the jihad, single members often solidify their participation by marrying the sisters of other members. The progressive detachment from the pursuit of material needs allows them to transcend their realistically frustrated aspirations, and promotes satisfaction with spiritual goals more consistent with their limited resources and opportunities, thus relieving the malaise arising from their exclusion and marginalized status. Their sacrifice and participation give them a sense of moral superiority, optimism and faith in the collective future. This trajectory from low-risk participation with an increasingly closer set of friends, to medium-risk proselytism in the name of an ideal way of life, to high-risk terrorism activities is a progressive and insidious one. This progression embraces an ideology that frames activism as a moral obligation demanding self-sacrifice and unflinching commitment. Ingroup love combined with outgroup hate is a strong incentive for committing mass murder and suicide.

## **5.2 Explanation of contents of the process model of radicalisation**

In this chapter we describe the results of an integration of the existing process models described in Section 5.1 and the comments and recommendations of different international radicalisation experts. These results consist of a graphical presentation of the process model of radicalisation and a description of each of the parts of the model.

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<sup>64</sup> Sageman, M. (2004). *Understanding terror networks*. Pennsylvania: university of Pennsylvania Press.





### **Legend of figure 7. Process model of radicalisation.**

The model consists of several aspects that are important to mention:

**Shape:** The triangular shape of the model symbolically represents the number of people who start the process of radicalisation (bottom), and who actually reach terrorism (top).

**Phases:** The model consists of five different phases. Though we believe the phases are likely to occur in a broadly chronological order, the reader should not consider the chronology to be strictly adhered to.

**Boxes:** Each box stands for a specific *mental process, behaviour, state, or trigger*. Each box need not be applied to each individual and the boxes have no specific order; people can skip certain boxes and repetitions can take place.

**Mental state:** These are the processes that occur within one's mind. They are thoughts that may (or may not) lead to (further) radicalisation.

**Behaviour:** Behaviours are defined by actions, which are the more visible part of the process of radicalisation. This does not by definition mean that these actions are visible.

**State:** States are the conditions of someone or something at a particular time.

**Trigger:** A trigger is an event that causes something to happen. In this case, the trigger may lead to escalated radicalisation.

**Transitions:** The transitions describe why an individual moves from one phase to another.

In the following pages we will give a more detailed overview of the phases, boxes and transitions.



The first phase of the model is called disillusionment and consists of three mental processes, two states and one trigger. There is no specific order to these boxes. In this phase the context in which a person may radicalize is clarified. The way people experience, perceive and deal with their personal problems are central themes. Many individuals will go through (parts) of Phase I without radicalizing further.

### *Mental processes.*

Psychological interpretation of personal conditions

One of the first steps in an individual's radicalisation process is his psychological interpretation of personal conditions (e.g. social, personal or political). This interpretation is characterized by *perceived* feelings of grief, tensions, frustration, repression, exclusion, deprivation, and alienation. *Perceived* is the key word here since many people have similar problems, whereas only some people perceive their problems to be so severe that they opt to seek solace in radical groups. The experience of these negative feelings is a *mental process* that takes place mostly inside the individual's head, and is therefore difficult to recognize.

Psychological interpretation of personal conditions in comparison to others

During this *mental process*, people compare their psychological interpretation of personal conditions to other people's situation. This comparison is characterized by perceived feelings of injustice, marginalization, and discrimination. As with the feelings described above, the feelings of injustice, marginalization, and discrimination are hard to recognize in an individual due to the fact that they occur inside the mind.


Psychological interpretation of own capabilities

Another *mental process* that occurs is that people interpret their own capabilities in a psychological way, and may, but does not necessarily, lead to the next step in the radicalisation process. Usually, after perceiving unfair treatment (another person gets a job, because she doesn't wear a niqab) an individual starts thinking of options to counter this experience (like finding a job where they allow a niqab). If the individual is able to find options to do so, he will leave the radicalisation spiral.




However, if an individual fails to find options, he is very likely to perceive this as a threat to his identity.

### *States.*




When an individual experiences negative feelings for any length of time, and when these feelings do not decrease or are not dealt with in a positive way, an individual is very likely to move into a *state* that we call “it’s not right”. This state is characterized by emotional vulnerability and dissatisfaction with current activities.



When an individual experiences feelings of injustice without being able to deal with these feelings, he runs a high risk of entering this *state* in the radicalisation process, that we call “it’s not fair”. In this state, the individual is sympathetic to likely minded individuals, and identifies himself with victims that are treated with injustice or discriminated for the same reasons.

### *Triggers.*



It is possible that we all experience the states and mental processes we described in the sections above. However, in order to continue in the radicalization process, a certain *trigger* needs to be present. At this point in the process, this trigger is a turning point in life, which is mostly recognizable because it is often an event (like the death of a loved one, or loss of one’s job, for example) or a crisis (economical or social). It could also be a range of smaller disappointments. It is important to note here that these trigger events can vary enormously per person.

### *Transition from Phase I to Phase II.*



#### **Transition 1: Irresolution**

One moves from Phase I to Phase II when one fails to find solutions for perceived problems within ones own capabilities. If a person experiences that they cannot deal with their problems, they starts looking for other solutions elsewhere.



This phase consists of three mental processes and three states and is characterized by the process of trying to find new solutions for perceived problems. Individuals in this phase experience that they cannot solve these problems within their own capabilities. In this phase they try to find a new “way of living” that gives them answers to their questions and helps them find what they are looking for. In this phase a shift from individual psychological processes to group (psychological) processes takes place. This shift is characterized by a change from mental processes that are hard to recognize to more observable behaviours.

*Mental processes.*

Ideological seekership

Usually ideological seekership means a spiritual quest, a religious quest, or a political quest. An individual thinks about who he is. The individual tries to figure out which religion, ideology or political ideas support his own feelings and which religion, ideology or political system might bring solutions for their current situation.

internalisation

During this mental process an individual adopts a new ideology that suits his ideas and beliefs, strengthening his identity. This mental process is characterized by the adoption of a spiritual, religious, or political problem-solving perspective and is accompanied by likeminded individuals. An individual experiences feelings of affiliation as well as an affective bond with converts. The new ideology suits the individual's identity, making him feel better. The new religion, ideology or political views gives meaning to the individual's current problems and has its own ways of dealing with these problems.


It's your fault

An individual that sympathizes with a certain ideology may start to blame others for his perceived problems (e.g., a young Muslim may blame the Jews for his personal despair). He attributes his problems and negative experiences to others. This may result in displacement of aggression, which means that this individual will shift the direction of his hostility from the real source of frustration towards an ostensibly unrelated person or object, usually someone or something weaker that is unable to




strike back. Furthermore, he starts to show mental support for a more extreme version of his new ideological organization, and experiences the legitimacy of this organization. All these characteristics are part of the *mental process* that we call “It’s your fault”.

### *Behaviours.*




Ideological seekership is expressed by seeking *behaviour* that we should be able to recognize. An individual on a quest tries to deepen his existing beliefs, or show shopping behaviour (i.e. compare alternatives of religions, political preferences, and so on). Furthermore, an individual looks for companionship and may find this with likeminded individuals.


### *States.*



The perceived identity threat puts the individual into a new *state* that we call cognitive opening to new worldviews. The person is open to other explanations for his current situation. This state is an important marker within the radicalisation process, because it is after this state that new behaviours may be seen and recognized.



The *state* that we call sympathized is the end point of the internalisation process. This state is characterized by understanding the feelings and ideas of the newly adapted ideology and by feeling compassion for the new ideology.



The thought of joining an extreme version of the organization provides a certain sense of reward to the individual. The individual believes that the extreme organization gives him something that he needs and therefore he wants to become a member of this organization.

### *Transition from Phase II to Phase III.*




#### **Transition 2: Membership Opportunity**

Once an individual has decided for himself that he wants to become a member of organization (with an extreme ideology), a certain *trigger* needs to be present to make this happen: there needs to be an opportunity for the individual to get in contact with the organization. The individual needs social ties such as friends or family who are already involved with the organization. We call these friends or family gatekeepers. An individual can also be



selected by a recruiter who introduces the individual to the organization. There is a difference between joining and being recruited. When an individual tries to join a radical group on his own, chances are that this person is more radicalised than a person who is recruited. Joining on one's own requires a more active position. Being recruited is more passive. This difference between joining and being recruited does not predict anything about the speed of the radicalisation process after one joins a radical group.



This phase consists of two mental processes, three behaviours and two states and is characterized by several identity processes. These kinds of activities can be found (in a milder form) during initiations. The radical organization tries to strengthen the ties between the group and the new recruits or joiners by taking away ones group and individual identity and by building a new identity that is all about the radical group, its causes and its members.

*Mental processes.*

**Migration from former (Individual) Identity**

An individual identity is defined by the conditions under which a person's identity is shaped by his own thoughts and experiences. However, a step in the radicalisation process is that the radical organization tries to break down this individual identity, both externally (behaviour) and internally (mental processes). We call this process de-individuation, which constitutes that the individual no longer sees himself as an entity separate from the group. Internally this means that individuals are expected to give up values, beliefs and attitudes that deviate from group values. They want individuals to stop thinking about their own unique qualities, because then the individual is at his most vulnerable, because he has no sense of self, and can be influenced according to the rules of the radical organization to become a trusted member. Other mental processes an individual experiences in this phase of the radicalisation process are the experience of fear and the experience that he has no other options in life (than to stay with the organization).

**Identity construction**

Another step for the individual is to develop a new identity, both at the



individual and group level. Some examples are moral engagement to the radical organization, progressively intensifying beliefs, value changes, social categorization, strengthening of us-versus-them feelings (this creates psychological distance between groups), and the development of feelings of ingroup love.

### *Behaviours.*

#### Migration from former (group) identity

Extreme organizations may use a certain strategy to create dependency among its new members. In this strategy psychological tactics (such as isolation, fear, affiliation and secrecy) are used that in the end make a member dependent on the organization. This process starts with dragging the individual away from the social groups he formerly belonged to. The following behaviours characterise this process: the individual alienates himself from social ties (such as friends and family) and ceases frequenting locations previously attended. Furthermore, the individual may even alienate himself from society in general.

#### Migration from former (individual) identity

This refers to a behavioural manifestation of the de-individuation process described above. De-individuation may manifest itself through behaviours such as a required forsaking of civilian clothes for uniforms.

#### Increased interaction with group

Identity construction takes place when the extreme organisation succeeds in taking away ones personal and group identity. Now the radical group is capable of shaping the individual's identity as they want it to be. The behavioural processes in the identity construction phase are manifested in intensive interaction with members of the organization. It is through this interaction that ingroup love develops, that beliefs are intensified, and so on.

### *States.*

#### "Being" without Group identity

The radical group needs to take away the individual's former group identity before constructing a new identity. The individual needs to experience how it feels to be "alone in the world" in order to be extremely motivated to become a trusted member of the radical group. In the state of "being without group identity" the individual no longer belongs to a social group, is alienated, and therefore has no group identity.

#### "Being" without Individual identity

The state of being without an individual identity is crucial to the radicalisation process, because it is the state in which the individual has no



sense of self and is consequently at his most vulnerable and malleable. It is in this state that he becomes dependent on the (extreme version of the) organization and starts to think in increasingly limited ways.

*Transition from Phase III to Phase IV.*




### **Transition 3: Complete Assimilation**

When an individual wants to be an official member and feels that his questions will be answered and problems will be solved by being in this group, he may go to the next phase. Those who figure out that being in this group is not helping them will try to find other ways to solve their problems or they will back out because they think that the ideas of the group are too radical.



Phase IV consists of one mental process, two behaviours and one state, and is characterized by a growing hate for the enemy and a growing support for violent solutions to perceived problems.

*Mental process.*



Once a member, the individual gradually adopts more radical ideas. Characteristic is labelling others (outside the radical organization) as evil. This phase is accompanied by *mental processes*, like feelings of hate towards the outgroup, perceptions of the outgroup as homogeneous, and the belief that action is required in order to gain justice. The individual starts to contrast acts of his radical organization to other (outgroup) acts that are worse, and also displaces and diffuses responsibilities (e.g., God ordered us to commit acts). Furthermore, the individual mentally prepares himself for personally executing aggressive acts, and develops a moral justification for the use violence. Finally, a predominance of activism over ideological or intellectual indoctrination develops within the individual.



### *Behaviours.*

You're Evil

Observable *Behaviours* characteristic of the above mental process are, for example, using euphemisms for harmful effects of one's own acts, dehumanizing the enemy and victims ("Jews are dogs"), and demonizing ("infidels are monsters") the enemy and victims.

Direct supporter of  
extremist organization

After having developed ideas and thoughts as described above, and labelling others as evil, an individual can be considered a direct supporter of the extremist organization. The *behaviours* that can be observed in a radicalising individual are characterized by participation in activities of moderate risk such as recruiting activities and fundraising.

### *States.*

Membership of  
organized  
radical group

After having developed a new identity and support for the group's (extreme) views, the individual becomes an official member of the organized radical group (like IRA, ETA, AlQaeda).

### *Transition from Phase IV to Phase V.*



#### **Transition 4: Practice what you preach**

Transition 4 is characterized by a concrete move towards violence. One makes this step when they feel that killing the name of their cause is legitimate, but also dying in the name their cause is legitimate. Those who do not feel this way will not move on to the next phase.



Phase V consists of two behaviours and is characterized by the link from radicalisation to terrorism.

### *Behaviours.*

**High Risk (terrorism-related) activities** This phase is characterized by extreme *behaviours* within the terrorist organization. Some examples are cell formation (including selection and role distribution), training (including acquiring intellectual and physical capabilities) and going operational (planning of the attack, acquiring weapons, arranging transportation, travelling to the target place and so on).

**Terrorist act** The terrorist act is the final marker of the radicalisation process. At this point, it is very difficult to stop the radicalised individual. Therefore, further analysis of this behaviour falls beyond the scope of this report.

## **5.3 Conclusion**

This process model of radicalisation, described in this chapter, is based on a literature study and a workshop. During the workshop we collected short-term advice and long-term recommendations on the first draft of this model. The advice and recommendations were specifically geared towards how to consolidate the model without losing important details, how to improve the content, how to improve the form of the model and how to validate the model. The short-term advice was used to create the version of the model that is described in this chapter. We will now discuss the long-term recommendations. Please note that these recommendations were based on the first draft version of the model, not the version described in this chapter.

In regards to consolidating the model without sacrificing important details, the workshop yielded two possibilities. First: concentrate on the various ways the radicalisation process can differ for different individuals from different social or cultural backgrounds and circumstances. This would entail creating different models for different types of individuals, which would indeed be very valuable for furthering radicalisation research. While we will certainly take this point into



account, we are not confident that it would necessarily lead to a more generalised model. Second: focus on the largest common denominators, that is, the aspects common to every – or at least most – radical groups. This course of action would entail researching which boxes are group-specific and which are common to most groups. While outside the scope of this project, this input would be valuable and more research on this aspect is necessary in the future.

We received two recommendations on how to improve the content of the model. First, the model's flexibility should be increased, for example in regards to different groups of people (educated vs. less-educated people, people living in a rural area vs. a large city). Indeed, there are different ways in which individuals radicalise and within radical groups, individuals have different roles and join for different reasons. We agree with the experts on this point: the model should be more flexible. It should be able to show different trajectories. This input is valuable and more research on this aspect is necessary in the future. Second, the architecture of the model does not precisely suggest the indicators and dimensions that can be measured. It does not mention the facilitators and multipliers, accelerators or decelerators, push or pull factors. The model only generally describes transitions from one phase to another. Future research will have to focus on more specifically defining the details and conditions of the transitions.

Finally, we received recommendations on how to create more quantitative data that can be used to enrich the knowledge on the process of radicalisation. First, we could use surveys for a quantitative validation. The surveys can be done with for example imprisoned radicals or deradicalised individuals, but also with experts at intelligence services. Second, we could validate our model through a meta-analysis of the original the case studies used to generate the original models analysed in the literature study. Third, we should consider possibilities to use a more experimental design with a control group to validate the model. In radicalisation research, as in much field work, control groups are rarely used, though this method does provide for rigorous evaluation. Fourth, trajectory analysis may provide ways to assess the existence and nature of parallel radicalisation trajectories. This is a method that is for example used by Nagin and Trembley<sup>65</sup> to measure trajectories of boys' physical aggression, opposition, and hyperactivity on the path to physically violent and nonviolent juvenile delinquency.

It seems clear that one of the most important aspects missing in this current model is flexibility. It misses the possibility to adapt to different trajectories, different roles, different cultures and different cases. We stated earlier in this report that the process of radicalisation does not occur in

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<sup>65</sup> Nagin, D. & Trembley, R. E. (1999). Trajectories of Boys' Physical Aggression, Opposition, and Hyperactivity on the Path to Physically Violent and Nonviolent Juvenile Delinquency. *Child development*, 70, 1181- 1196.



any pre-determined order. That is to say that radicalisation cannot be accurately represented simply as the sum of its parts. Rather it is a complex and dynamic system in which the key to understanding it lies in understanding when the system will change as a result of internal or external stimuli. We propose creating a process model of radicalisation using a dynamic systems approach, which is a method that maps non-linear systems. Examples of non-linear systems are the weather and ecosystems, in which small changes in one part of the system can have big consequences somewhere else. Central to theories of non-linear systems is the idea of describing the systems in terms of stability and change in states the system can take on (e.g. changes from a stable high-pressure weather system to a low-pressure system). The FP7 Project “SAFIRE” will focus on these non-linear methods to explain the process of radicalisation.



## 6. Interventions: *What can be done to prevent or halt radicalisation?*

In this chapter we will give an overview of several operational interventions that can be carried out by professionals who work in the field. The interventions are extracted from literature and interviews with experts.

With an “intervention concerning radicalisation” we mean “*An action one carries out to stop or prevent radicalisation.*” We collected *operational* interventions, which means we focussed on interactions that can be carried out directly with the individuals. For example, staff meetings on Monday afternoons are not taken into account. Examples of the kind of professionals who can carry out these kinds of interventions are civil servants of small communities, police, teachers, social workers and juridical partners. To organise these interventions we used the following structure based on a Dutch study<sup>66</sup> :

- ***Preventive intervention:*** An intervention meant to prevent radicalisation.
- ***Curative intervention:*** An intervention meant to stop radicalisation after specific individuals have shown signs of radicalisation. These interventions are focussed on the use of soft measures.
- ***Repressive intervention:*** An intervention meant to stop radicalisation after specific individuals have shown signs of radicalisation. These interventions are focussed the use of hard measures.

We will now give an overview of the preventive, curative and repressive interventions we identified in this study. For each of the interventions we will identify the phase to which the intervention is most applicable.

### 6.1 Preventive intervention methods

#### *Education*

This intervention method is directed at educating youth on radicalisation related topics. The premise is that youngsters will be better able to resist radicalisation if they are aware of the process. Using education to prevent radicalisation can be applied in a couple of ways:

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<sup>66</sup> VNG/RADAR (2006). Radicalisme Signaleren en Aanpakken. Vroegtijdige aanpak van radicaliserende jongeren. Handreiking voor gemeenten.



- Educate youngsters on stereotypes, discrimination, extremism, democratic order, norms and values, cultural diversity and racism.
- Other education projects can include, a visit to a concentration camp, a visit to the museum about World War II, receiving a newspaper and website addressing discrimination, intolerance and cultural diversity.

Most of these interventions can be carried out in school, but may also be done outside of school by professionals other than teachers. Education can be applied to different typologies of radical groups (e.g. nationalist/separatist groups, radical Islamist groups, leftist groups).

Education as a preventive intervention can be represented in the process model of radicalisation in two different ways. Education can be part of an obligatory class in school or part of a programme at a mosque. In this case, teachers or Imams can try to intervene in a group using education as long as the people are obligated to take the class. To reach groups of youngsters with education projects that are not obligatory, more effort from the youngster is needed. The impact is expected to be less. Therefore this intervention can be used best during the “Disillusionment” phase and the “Playing the field” phase. It can also be carried out during early stages of the “Indoctrination” phase, but we would expect it to have less impact than in earlier phases.

### *Training for professionals*

Courses and training can be developed<sup>67</sup> especially for professionals who work with potential radicals to create more awareness of radicalisation, on how to stop radicalisation and on how to prevent it. For example:

- Study days on Islam, fundamentalism, radicalisation, segregation and exclusion.
- Conversation methods that can be used to create equal communication, to react to discrimination or to increase or decrease communication between individuals.
- Methods to contact the right individuals. These methods are directed towards “finding a way in” with the (potential) radical.
- Courses on the development of children and adolescents. What does the world look like through their eyes?

Most of the contents of the courses can be used for the different typologies of radical groups. Some of the topics are of course very specific for just one typology (e.g. study days on Islam).

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<sup>67</sup> Or has been, for example in the Netherlands.



Training professionals to improve their knowledge and skills is important for every phase of the process model of radicalisation. The further in the process you go, the more specific the knowledge needed and the more difficult it is to intervene in the processes.

### *Conversation*

This intervention method focuses on conversation strategies that professionals can use while speaking to (potentially) radical youngsters. The goal of conversation is to give the youngsters a sense of belonging. Some first-line workers like to use their intuition and their experience when talking to the youngsters, while others choose to apply certain methods, such as the “Socratic Conversation” or the “Moral Dilemma Discussion Method”. With this intervention we are curious about the effect of the match between different kinds of social workers and their charges. Are male social workers better at connecting with young boys or are female social workers just as capable? Are old or young professionals better at getting through to the youngsters? These different conversation methods can be applied to preventing radicalisation with different typologies of radical groups (e.g. nationalist/separatist groups, radical Islamist groups, leftist groups).

This intervention will have most impact in the first phases of the process of radicalisation, because this is the moment when the youngsters are still seeking information and answers. Specifically, we see applications in “Disillusionment”, “Playing the field” and the early phases of “Indoctrination”. After the early phases of indoctrination, conversation strategies on their own will probably not be enough and more specific details on certain ideologies are needed.

### *From the inside out*

This intervention method is focussed on preventing or stopping radicalisation from within the group itself. It is all about supporting youngsters or organisations that are involved in organising activities that could positively influence (potentially radical) youngsters. The interventions are about counteraction from “their own” people. An example of this kind of intervention is to set up a radio station where youngsters have a platform from which they can give their opinions and inspire each other by doing positive things. Also, a hardcore party (a music style that is associated with extreme rightists in the Netherlands) with an anti-discrimination theme and folders or e-zines with topics relevant to the group at risk are possibilities. These interventions could be used specifically for youngsters at risk of drifting to the extreme right. Most of the interventions can be applied to the different typologies of radicalisation. Some of the topics are of course very specific for just one typology (e.g. a hardcore party).



This intervention demands a certain amount of effort from youngsters. The advantage is that the activities are organised by “their own”. This is why this intervention could have impact in the “disillusion” phase, the “playing the field” phase and the “indoctrination phase”. After a person starts to alienate himself from former friends, family and surroundings, this impact of this intervention will like by negatively affected. This strategy also requires actively seeking out and engaging the target audience, as youngsters will probably not search for and go to these kinds of activities on their own. Only on-line activities might reach the target group.

In a special case of “from the inside out” we can also distinguish something we call “religious defensibility”. This intervention method is the same as the “regular” form of “inside out” but is specifically directed at ideological aspects of the Islam. Religious defensibility interventions are meant to show youngsters the nonviolent side of Islam and are aimed at keeping youngsters away from extreme versions of Islam. It is very important for the credibility of the interventions that they are carried out by Muslims. Some of the specific interventions can be carried out by Imams and/or Mosque committees in cooperation with other professional workers. There are several different possibilities:

- Supporting Imams in discussing societal themes with youngsters that might be radicalising. The themes can be discussed during conferences, with reading material, study days, training at theme-based meetings.
- Response to violent material on the Internet. The growing amount of violent Islamic material on the Internet is unstoppable, but we can also increase the amount of nonviolent material on the Internet. Discussion forums can be used for positive nonviolent purposes. Folders or e-zines about relevant themes can be sent out to the youngsters. It is also important that there are Internet sites that have information on how to be a good Muslim living in a Western society without being violent or radical.
- Discussing ideologies with youngsters. This can be a discussion between youngsters and an Imam, or between orthodox and liberal Muslims, or even between people who live in the same neighbourhood.

### *Contact Hypothesis*

This intervention method is directed to decreasing the perceived psychological distance between groups. That is to say that the outgroup is perceived as being more similar and more internally diverse than previously thought. One of the consequences of this interventions is a reduction of polarisation, which in some cases may contribute to radicalisation. Interventions are mostly



activities connecting groups of youngsters from different cultures. Examples of these kinds of activities are local meetings, neighbourhood meetings, making a movie together about a relevant topic, workshop for youngsters and parents, soccer games, survival weekends, summer school, dialogue days, supporting Ramadan (visit an Islamic family for Ramadan), interreligious readings and theatre projects. Most of the interventions can be applied to the different typologies of radicalisation in connection to another sample of the general population. Some of the interventions can be specifically developed for just one typology.

This type of intervention requires a certain amount of effort from youngsters. First they have to hear about the initiative (of for example a football game) and they actually have to show up there and join the game. This intervention may have the most impact in the “disillusionment phase” and the “playing the field” phase. After that phase, youngsters will probably not be interested in joining the activity or might not even be allowed to join by other group members due to their increasingly radical viewpoint.

#### *Role models or high potentials*

This intervention method is directed at inspiring groups of youngster to do positive things. High potentials or role models can inspire the youngsters in different ways, for example, with the help of long-term individual projects. In this case we could call it “individual mentoring” which is a *curative* intervention method described below. Role models or high potentials can also inspire youngsters in short term projects, such as a demonstration, a workshop, an article in a paper or a speech. Examples of role models or high potentials are football players, rappers, actors or very successful businesspeople. This kind of intervention can be applied to any of the typologies. It is very important to keep in mind which role model or high potential to use to inspire which (potential) radical group.

Since this type of intervention is mostly not obligatory, a certain amount of action is required from youngsters to be able to know about and participate in these kind of activities. Therefore, activities such as a demonstration, a workshop or a speech will only have impact on youngsters who find themselves in the “disillusionment phase” and the “playing the field phase.” Articles written by role models for newspapers and magazines have a relatively broad reach and youngsters can read the information in relative private, away from peer evaluation. Therefore, doubting individuals in the “indoctrination phase” might be inspired by reading a story written by a role model or a high potential. Articles in newspapers or magazines might have less impact compared to face-to-face encounters, because meeting a role model or high potential in person is likely to make a stronger impression.



### *Interventions for women*

This intervention method is especially developed for Muslim women. Interventions for this group focus on emancipation and empowerment of women. Important is to show them how this is possible within modern Islam. Next to Koran lessons, swimming or other sport programmes are organised specifically for women. These interventions target the prevention of radicalisation that could lead to a connection with radical Islamist groups.

Taking part in the activities organised especially for women might take a certain amount of effort on the part of the participants. The phases that this type of intervention might have influence on are the “disillusionment phase” and the “playing the field phase.”

### *Parents*

This cluster of interventions is directed at supporting Islamic parents in raising their children in a Western society. The gap between generations is a known cause for alienation of migrant youngsters. Specific interventions are directed at strengthening the dialogue between Muslim boys and their fathers and between mothers and daughters. Parents can also take courses on enhancing their parenting skills or how to keep their children in school. These courses focus on helping traditional parents with dealing with youngsters growing up in a modern western world. In the Netherlands these interventions are specifically developed for Islamic or immigrant youngsters and their parents, for whom the generation gap is especially relevant. Often such training is developed to help prevent contact with radical Islamist groups and the ensuing radicalisation.

This is a somewhat indirect intervention. The focus is on training parents, who are raising their children in a modern Western society. The impact of this type of intervention also depends on the relationship that parents have with their children in the first place. The parents' impact will possibly be greatest in the first phases (“disillusionment” and the “playing the field.”) and decrease in strength in subsequent phases.

### *Empowerment*

This cluster of interventions is directed at empowering Muslim youths in several different ways. The individual capacities and talents of youngsters should be pointed out to them instead of pointing out victimisation and shortcomings. Interventions focused on increasing empowerment can be carried out in several ways:

- Offering empowerment training



- Stimulating identity development by increasing empathetic capabilities, development of self critique, and feelings of responsibility to society.
- Using the Internet: Youngsters can be taught how they can use their capabilities in the democratic order and how they can participate in the public debate by using the Internet. For example, by gaining information from different perspectives, making a case for their own opinions, knowing how to contest illegitimate judgements, knowing how to organise actions around themes that are relevant to them.

These interventions are mostly directed at Muslim youngsters and fall within the prevention of radicalisation and of connections with radical Islamist groups.

Most of these interventions are not obligatory, and can only take place when a youngster puts a certain amount of effort into participating. When carried out in early phases the impact looks very promising. Therefore, the phases that this type of intervention might have most influence on are the “disillusionment phase” and the “playing the field phase.”

## **6.2 Curative intervention methods**

### *Individual network approach*

This intervention method is directed at creating a network around a (potentially) radical individual. While carrying out this kind of intervention the focus is on the cooperation between different people connected to the (potentially) radical individual. It is important that many people are aware of the situation and that they work together to find a way to stop or prevent the individual from (further) radicalisation or alienation. Examples of people who can create the network around the individual are

- First line workers such as police, teachers, youth workers and intelligence services.
- Other key figures in an individual’s life such as, friends, family, Mosques, Imams, employers or a sports coach.

This network can be a combination of the different official and unofficial connections, in which the individual is being guided into a pre-planned trajectory. This method can be applied to halt radicalisation with different typologies of radical groups (e.g. nationalist/separatist groups, radical Islamist groups, leftist groups). The difference lies in which connections to add to the network.



This type of intervention does not ask much from the radical itself, but it does require a lot of organization. When and if this intervention is carried out successfully, it will most likely influence youngsters at the stages “playing the field”, “indoctrination”, and “radicalisation in deed/terrorism in word”. This has to do with the fact that as many people as possible in an individual’s environment try to pull him back. These people can be professionals, but also people with whom the individual shares personal relations. If this intervention is carried out too early, it might cause a person to radicalise, because if professionals just assume that a person is radical it might lead to stigmatisation.

### *Internship or job*

This intervention method is focuses on offering (potentially) radical youngsters an internship or a job. By offering help to youngsters who cannot find a job or an internship, we try to make these youngsters less vulnerable and we try to get them to reconnect with Western society. This kind of help consists of:

- Directly offering these youngsters a job or an internship; for example the police can hire youngsters to monitor safety in their neighbourhoods or other public places such as swimming pools.
- Offering youngsters other things that might help them attain a job or an internship, such as additional schooling, courses on motivation, behavioural rules in job settings, or what it means to have work experience. These kinds of interventions are also directed at making sure that students stay in school or to help youngsters, who had previously quit school, return.

Offering youngsters a job or an internship can prevent them from becoming bored or frustrated about their job situation in the first place. In addition, when youngsters are in the process of radicalising, offering them a job or an internship gives the radicalising youngster a different goal and keeps him connected to society. This method can be applied to halt radicalisation with different typologies of radical groups (e.g. nationalist/separatist groups, radical Islamist groups, leftist groups). The challenge is to find a good and suitable place for these youngsters to work.

This type of intervention, when successfully carried out may impact a potential radical in the phases “playing the field”, “indoctrination”, and “radicalisation in deed/terrorism in word”. Having a job can be a way for youngsters to do something useful during the day, make money, take responsibilities, become independent. If the job is not successful, for example when the youngster is not accepted, does not like his colleagues, or when the job is too difficult, it might cause radicalisation to increase.



### *Individual Mentoring*

This intervention method is directed at actively mentoring (potentially) radical individuals. It is a personal approach in which a mentor attaches himself to a specific individual to help him reach positive goals and decrease his negative behaviour. For this type of intervention high potentials, youth workers, youth ambassadors, volunteers from the neighbourhood, peer educators, and role models are used. This type of intervention is carried out because it is believed that you earn trust by showing the youngsters that they can really rely on a person to help them with specific problems. Youngsters do not see radicalisation as their problem; they experience other problems they need help with such as not being able to find a job. This method can be applied to halt radicalisation with different typologies of radical groups (e.g. nationalist/separatist groups, radical Islamist groups, leftist groups).

This intervention asks for acceptance and effort from a (potential) radical. Therefore it might have the most impact in the “playing the field” phase, the “indoctrination” phase and the “radicalisation in deed/radicalism in word” phase. If carried out too early, it might increase radicalisation because the youngster may perceive the offered help as evidence of low expectations or may experience feelings of being misunderstood. Therefore, professionals working with youngsters in the “playing the field” phase have to be extra careful.

### *Deradicalisation*

In many cases, professionals may only suspect that an individual is radicalising; often there is little or no concrete evidence. This particular intervention method is focussed on halting radicalisation when professionals are almost sure that radicalisation is occurring. There are several possibilities:

- Dividing groups in sub groups and individuals. A curative group approach and infiltration in which one tries to gather information on the structure of a group in order to distinguish several roles. After this the professional can try to take the group apart by approaching (and influencing) the right people at the right time.
- Actively trying to stop alienation. This means that professionals have to try to stay in contact with (individuals within) the radical group.
- Concrete exit programs in which a radical individual gets help when he decides he wants to leave the radical group.
- Parents who decide it is best for their son or daughter to be placed in an institution where they have to participate in intensive day programmes.



The exit programmes were originally developed for extreme rightists and have been realised in for example Germany and Sweden.

This type of intervention is directed towards individuals and groups who are almost certainly radical. Therefore it can be applied in the phases “indoctrination” and “radicalisation in deed/terrorism in word”. When this type of intervention is carried out too early, it might contribute to increased radicalisation.

### **6.3 Repressive Intervention Methods**

#### *Sanctions*

This intervention method is about setting rules for and consequences of not following these rules. With this method, we focus on influencing behaviour instead of thoughts. The following interventions can be found in this cluster:

- Setting rules such as: clothing regulations, prohibition of discriminatory statements in the form of slogans, symbols and buttons, and the prohibition of gatherings, demonstrations and manifestations.
- Sanctions (only used in late stages of radicalisation when an individual is perceived as dangerous) such as stopping allowances and welfares, arrest, harassment (e.g. when intelligence services follow the individuals constantly), prohibition of the use of public facilities, and freezing bank accounts.

This method can be applied to halt radicalisation with different typologies of radical groups (e.g. nationalist/separatist groups, radical Islamist groups, leftist groups).

According to the experts we interviewed, this type of intervention might also have a preventive impact. Since the punishment is pretty severe, it might be a way to actually prevent youngsters from going too far, because they know what consequences are attached to “bad” behaviours. When these kinds of interventions are actually carried out, the effects on radicalisation are questionable. It seems that not many professionals support these kinds of interventions, because they cause youngsters to radicalise even more. These interventions are preventive in the “indoctrination” or “playing the field” phases and are used as a repressive method in the “radicalisation in deed/ terrorism in word phase.



## 6.4 Overview of interventions connected to the process model of radicalisation.

In this chapter we gave an overview of preventive, curative and repressive interventions. Each of the interventions we identified the phase to which the intervention is most applicable. The table gives an overview of what interventions can be matched with what phase.

It is clear that in the first 3 phases there are more possibilities towards intervening. The further into the radicalisation process the more difficult it gets to intervene.

Also, it becomes clear that a very important intervention is training professionals. This does not mean that training professionals is the most effective intervention for preventing or halting radicalisation.

Interventions >	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
<b>Phases:</b>														
"Disillusionment"	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x					
"Playing the field"	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		x	x		
"Indoctrination"	x	x	x	x			x	x		x	x	x	x	x
"Radicalisation in deed/terrorism in word"		x								x			x	x
"Terrorism"		x												

Preventive: 1-9

Curative: 10-13

Repressive: 14

Interventions:

1= Education

2= Training for professionals

3= Conversation

4= From the inside out

5= Contact hypothesis

6= Role models or high potentials

7= Interventions for women

8= Parents

9 = Empowerment

10= Individual network approach

11= Internship or job

12= Individual mentoring

13= Deradicalisation

14= Sanctions



## 6.5 Concluding Remarks

In this chapter we described a number of different intervention methods, which professionals in the field can carry out in order to prevent or halt the process of radicalisation. The interventions we describe in this chapter are still rather broad, however, the disadvantage of which is that professionals feel they cannot use this information as a practical guide. Alternatively, the general advantage is that the guidelines can be used by any kind of professional who works directly with (potential) radicals in the field. Lousberg, van Hemert en Langelaan<sup>68</sup> describe the minimum requirements that should be taken into account for the intervention to have a chance at a positive effect. Also, they give an overview of the subjective effectiveness of each of the intervention methods. Professionals in the field have contributed to this research by indicating if they thought the various intervention methods would be effective for preventing or halting radicalisation. We recommend that these requirements be taken into account and that for specific groups of professionals in the field a more detailed version of each of the intervention guidelines should be developed. In the next chapter we will discuss intervention guidelines at the European level.

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<sup>68</sup> Lousberg, M., Hemert van, D., Langelaan, S. (2009) Ingrijpen bij radicalisering- de mogelijkheden voor de eerstelijnswerker. TNO DV 2009 C365. (Dealing with radicalisation: Options for first line workers)



## 7. European Initiatives

The European Union identified the fight against terrorism as one of the greatest challenges the Union is facing today. The complex nature of this phenomenon forces the EU to adopt a multi-pronged approach; one of them being the radicalisation of individuals who would turn to violent means in order to foster their political agenda. However, the initial focus in the formulation of an EU counter-terrorism policy was on security, legal and law-enforcement issues.

### *The Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism*

In the wake of the terror attacks of 11<sup>th</sup> September 2001, under the presidency of Belgium, the European Council adopted a Plan of Action to Combat Terrorism. This plan was dominated by concerns on how to increase the direct security of the European citizens. Also the *Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism*, adopted by the Council on 13<sup>th</sup> June 2002, focused on criminal law and jurisdictional harmonisation in order to improve counter-terrorism efforts by the law enforcement authorities.<sup>69</sup>

### *The Declaration on Combating Terrorism*

After the bombings of Madrid on 11<sup>th</sup> March 2004, the *European Council Declaration on Combating Terrorism* of 25<sup>th</sup> March 2004 extended the scope of anti-terrorism to indirect measures, such as radicalisation, and called on the Commission to draw on the expertise of the *European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia* to oppose violent radicalisation within European societies.<sup>70</sup> The declaration also created the position of the EU Counter-terrorism Coordinator (CTC). Mr. Gijs de Vries was appointed to that position until 2007. His main tasks were to coordinate the work of the Council of the EU in combating terrorism, to maintain an overview of all the instruments at the Union's disposal, to closely monitor the implementation of the EU Action Plan on Combating Terrorism, and to secure the visibility of the Union's policies in the fight against terrorism. Since September 2007, Mr. Gilles de Kerchove holds this position.<sup>71</sup>

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<sup>69</sup> <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2002:164:0003:0007:EN:PDF>

<sup>70</sup> <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/DECL-25.3.pdf>

<sup>71</sup> <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1344&lang=FR>



### *The Communication on prevention, preparedness and response to terrorist attacks*

On 20<sup>th</sup> October 2004, in response to inquiries by the European Council, the European Commission published a *Communication on prevention, preparedness and response to terrorist attacks*. “Opposing violent radicalization within our societies and disrupting the conditions facilitating the recruitment of terrorists must be fundamental priorities in a strategy to prevent terrorism. The Commission intends to contribute to related work in the Council in 2005 by drawing inter alia on the expertise of the European Monitoring centre on racism and xenophobia, experts and researchers.”<sup>72</sup>

### *The Hague Programme*

Counter-radicalisation was then included in the Presidency Conclusions of 4/5<sup>th</sup> November 2004, the so called *Hague Programme*, where the Council was asked, by the end of 2005, to “develop a long-term strategy to address the factors which contribute to radicalisation and recruitment for terrorist activities.”<sup>73</sup> The Programme set out ten priorities for the Union with a view to strengthening the area of freedom, security and justice. In order to achieve this goal, the document stressed the importance of a comprehensive approach that would include integrated anti-terrorism measures. The comprehensive approach also included a focus on recruitment and prevention.

On 7<sup>th</sup> June 2005, in its *Recommendation to the European Council and the Council on the EU anti-terrorism Action Plan*, the European Parliament explicitly underlined the importance of counter-radicalisation measures. It requested the Commission “to identify and study best practice in the Member States and third countries in the area of anti-terrorist policies and the prevention of radicalisation, which could form the basis for the Commission's strategy”.<sup>74</sup>

### *The Communication on Terrorist recruitment: addressing the factors contributing to violent radicalisation.*

The danger of home-grown terrorism manifested itself in the London bombings of 7<sup>th</sup> July 2005 and counter-radicalisation ranked more prominently on the agenda since it promised to be essential to keeping European citizens safe. Hence, the European Commission developed on

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<sup>72</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/justice\\_home/doc\\_centre/criminal/terrorism/doc/com\\_2004\\_698\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/doc_centre/criminal/terrorism/doc/com_2004_698_en.pdf)

<sup>73</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/justice\\_home/news/information\\_dossiers/the\\_hague\\_priorities/doc/hague\\_programme\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/news/information_dossiers/the_hague_priorities/doc/hague_programme_en.pdf)

<sup>74</sup> <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+20050607+ITEMS+DOC+XML+V0//EN - sdocta9>



these ideas and adopted them in the Communication of 21<sup>st</sup> September 2005, entitled “*Terrorist recruitment: addressing the factors contributing to violent radicalisation.*”<sup>75</sup> In it, the Commission identified various existing EU policies, which could play an important role in addressing the problem. Violent radicalisation was defined as the “phenomenon of people embracing opinions, views and ideas which could lead to acts of terrorism as defined in Article 1 of the Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism”. The Commission outlined that the measures required would entail a combination of soft measures, such as intercultural exchange programmes among juveniles, and hard measures, such as the ban of broadcasting inciting violence or terrorism.

### *The EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism*

Initiatives pushing in this direction were bundled in the *EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism*, which was adopted by the Council in December 2005.<sup>76</sup> Identifying and addressing the factors contributing to violent radicalisation were identified as being an important priority of the Commission's counter-terrorism policy. “The Strategy sets out three general strands for EU action: to disrupt the activities of networks and individuals who draw people into terrorism, to ensure that voices of mainstream opinion prevail over those of extremism and to promote – yet more vigorously – security, justice, democracy and opportunity for all. The Strategy and the accompanying classified Action Plan (updated under the German Presidency) contain both joint standards and new measures. While recognising the primacy of the Member States in the field of radicalisation and recruitment, the Strategy proposes a set of specific measures for implementation at European level. These measures cover all three pillars and require close cooperation between the Council and the Commission.”<sup>77</sup>

### *The EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy*

On 16<sup>th</sup> December 2005 the European Council adopted the *European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy*.<sup>78</sup> The aim of this Strategy was to take the *EU Action Plan on Terrorism* into the next phase. The Strategy committed the European Union “to combat terrorism globally while respecting human rights, and to make Europe safer, allowing its citizens to live in an area of freedom, security and justice.” It stated that terrorism poses a threat to all states and to all peoples. Terrorism is considered to be a criminal and unjustifiable act under any circumstances.

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<sup>75</sup> <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2005:0313:FIN:EN:PDF>

<sup>76</sup> <http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/05/st14/st14781-re01.en05.pdf>

<sup>77</sup> <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/07/st15/st15443.en07.pdf>

<sup>78</sup> <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/05/st14/st14469-re04.en05.pdf>



The Strategy established four strands of work in the EU's counter-terrorism effort: Prevention, Protection, Pursuit and Response. Although the Strategy underlined that Member States (MS) maintain the primary responsibility for combating terrorism, the EU was intended to add value by strengthening national capabilities, facilitating cooperation among MS, developing collective capabilities and promoting international partnerships. The document states explicitly that as a community based on democratic values and principles, the EU had to pursue its goals in a democratic and accountable way.

Counter-radicalisation belongs to the first pillar of prevention. Under this heading the EU aims "to prevent people turning to terrorism by tackling the factors or root causes which can lead to radicalisation and recruitment, both in Europe and internationally." The key priorities were identified as:

- Develop common approaches to spot and tackle problematic behaviour, in particular the misuse of the Internet;
- Address incitement and recruitment in key environments (for example prisons and places of religious training or worship) notably by introducing new criminal offences covering such behaviour;
- Develop a media and communication strategy to explain EU policies more effectively;
- Promote good governance, democracy, education and economic prosperity through Community and Member State assistance programmes;
- Develop intercultural dialogue within the Union and outside it;
- Develop a non-emotive lexicon for discussing the issues; and
- To further develop the EU's understanding of the issues and policy responses through continued research and the sharing of experience and analysis.

On the issue of radicalisation the Strategy states that violent radicalisation may be loosely defined as the phenomenon of people embracing opinions, views and ideas which could lead to those acts of terrorism as they are defined in Article 1 of the Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism.<sup>79</sup> The EU intended to engage in a long-term strategy of eradicating the problem of terrorism at the source. This involves the complex and daunting task of identifying the factors that are leading people to radicalise and making them turn to violence or join terrorist groups, and subsequently address those factors through well-targeted policies. Although radicalisation tends to be a rather localised problem and therefore best fought by the Member States, the span

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<sup>79</sup> <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2002:164:0003:0007:EN:PDF>



of existing EU policies that could be used to address violent radicalisation can play a role in complementing and supporting Member State action.

Reporting on the implementation of the counter-terrorism efforts of the EU, the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator pointed out in a note to the Council that “Work on an EU strategy for combating radicalisation and recruitment has progressed well and is expected to be endorsed by the European Council in December 2005 together with an action plan to implement the recommendations of the strategy. The strategy sets out the EU's determination to disrupt the activities of networks which draw people into terrorism, ensure that voices of mainstream opinion prevail over those of extremism, and to promote yet more vigorously security, justice, democracy and opportunity for all.”<sup>80</sup>

*The communication setting up a group of experts to provide policy advice to the Commission on fighting violent radicalisation.*

In order to have access to outside expertise, the Commission decided on 19<sup>th</sup> April 2006 to set up a group of experts to provide policy advice to the Commission on fighting violent radicalisation.<sup>81</sup> To draw on a wider pool of expertise, the Commission initiated in 2007 a public tender and called for proposals for a Programme for the prevention of and response to violent radicalisation.<sup>82</sup> Furthermore, the Commission allocated funds to support research projects in the field of radicalisation. Calls included projects for the establishment of a European network of experts on violent radicalisation<sup>83</sup>, study on the best practices in cooperation between authorities and civil society with a view to the prevention and response to violent radicalisation<sup>84</sup> and studies on violent radicalisation.<sup>85</sup> These four studies<sup>86</sup> were considered important for the EU's policy-making in the area.

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<sup>80</sup> <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/05/st15/st15704.en05.pdf>

<sup>81</sup> <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:111:0009:01:EN:HTML>

<sup>82</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/justice\\_home/funding/2004\\_2007/radicalisation/doc/call\\_2007\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/funding/2004_2007/radicalisation/doc/call_2007_en.pdf)

<sup>83</sup> [http://ted.europa.eu/Exec?jsessionId=859604A715EDD07D26009750E2EA0057.instance\\_2?DataFlow=N\\_one\\_doc\\_access.dfl&Template=TED/N\\_one\\_result\\_detail\\_curr.htm&docnumber=174117-2007&docId=174117-2007&StatLang=EN](http://ted.europa.eu/Exec?jsessionId=859604A715EDD07D26009750E2EA0057.instance_2?DataFlow=N_one_doc_access.dfl&Template=TED/N_one_result_detail_curr.htm&docnumber=174117-2007&docId=174117-2007&StatLang=EN)

<sup>84</sup> [http://ted.europa.eu/Exec?DataFlow=N\\_one\\_doc\\_access.dfl&Template=TED/N\\_one\\_result\\_detail\\_curr.htm&docnumber=5552-2007&docId=5552-2007&StatLang=EN](http://ted.europa.eu/Exec?DataFlow=N_one_doc_access.dfl&Template=TED/N_one_result_detail_curr.htm&docnumber=5552-2007&docId=5552-2007&StatLang=EN)

<sup>85</sup> [http://ted.europa.eu/Exec?DataFlow=N\\_one\\_doc\\_access.dfl&Template=TED/N\\_one\\_result\\_detail\\_curr.htm&docnumber=48784-2006&docId=48784-](http://ted.europa.eu/Exec?DataFlow=N_one_doc_access.dfl&Template=TED/N_one_result_detail_curr.htm&docnumber=48784-2006&docId=48784-)

[2006&StatLang=EN](#)

<sup>86</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/justice\\_home/fsj/terrorism/prevention/fsj\\_terrorism\\_prevention\\_prevent\\_en.htm - part 2](http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/terrorism/prevention/fsj_terrorism_prevention_prevent_en.htm - part 2)



### *The implementation reports of the EU Strategy and Action Plan to Combat Terrorism*

On 23<sup>rd</sup> November 2007, the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator sent the first implementation report of the EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment that was requested by the Council on a biannual base.<sup>87</sup> It states that “the Council and the Commission have made some progress in the implementation of the Strategy. Overall, however, implementation has been uneven. While in some areas new initiatives were launched, in others (such as EU cooperation with regard to the prevention of radicalisation at educational institutions, training for religious leaders, and community policing) cooperation remained limited to exchange of information on a limited scale.” The reports, published on 26<sup>th</sup> May 2008<sup>88</sup>, 19<sup>th</sup> November 2008<sup>89</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup> June 2009<sup>90</sup> and 26<sup>th</sup> November 2009<sup>91</sup>, the CTC outlined the progress of the initiatives of the individual Member States and encourages stakeholders to step up their efforts.

### *The Conclusions on enhancing cooperation in the area of countering radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism*

On 8<sup>th</sup> July 2008, recalling that the challenge of combating radicalisation and terrorist recruitment lies primarily with the Member States, the Economic and Financial affairs council meeting called on increased cooperation on counter-radicalisation, notably an increase in sharing of intelligence among Member States, “(4) CALLS upon Member States to launch further joint initiatives in the different areas of countering radicalisation and recruitment not yet covered by existing national or EU initiatives. (5) CALLS upon those Member States with most experience of countering radicalisation and recruitment in a certain field to share their best practices in that area.”<sup>92</sup>

*In its Own Initiative Opinion of 8<sup>th</sup> November 2008, the Committee of the Regions emphasised that initiatives in counter-radicalisation should primarily remain the responsibility of local authorities.*<sup>93</sup>

A revised version of the EU Radicalisation and Recruitment Action Plan is currently being discussed. It has been sent to the Article 36 Committee to decide upon its publication.<sup>94</sup>

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<sup>87</sup> <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/07/st15/st15443.en07.pdf>

<sup>88</sup> <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st09/st09416-re01.en08.pdf>

<sup>89</sup> <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/st15912.en08.pdf>

<sup>90</sup> <http://www.statewatch.org/news/2009/jun/eu-report-ct-action-plan-9715-rev1-09.pdf>

<sup>91</sup> <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st15/st15358.en09.pdf>

<sup>92</sup> [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/101728.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/101728.pdf)

<sup>93</sup> [http://cor.europa.eu/COR\\_cms/ui/ViewDocument.aspx?siteid=default&contentID=816ea212-db19-48bc-8601-50f43d68b978](http://cor.europa.eu/COR_cms/ui/ViewDocument.aspx?siteid=default&contentID=816ea212-db19-48bc-8601-50f43d68b978)

<sup>94</sup> <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st15/st15374.en09.pdf>



In the 2009 *Stockholm Programme – An open and secure Europe serving and protecting the citizens*,<sup>95</sup> the European Council calls upon Member States to develop prevention mechanisms, in particular to allow the early detection of signs of radicalisation or threats, including threats from violent, militant extremism, and the Commission, the Council and Member States to improve initiatives to counter radicalisation in all vulnerable populations on the basis of an evaluation of the effectiveness of national policies; Member States should identify best practices and specific operational tools to be shared with other Member States; new areas of work could include integration and the fight against discrimination.

As a conclusion one could argue the scope of EU's response to terrorism was gradually enlarged and became increasingly integrated. Indeed, the initial measures pertaining to judicial cooperation were completed with a variety of other initiatives ranging from the detection of factors leading to violent radicalization to the seizing of bank accounts related to terrorism. In the process, more and more European bodies worked on the issue, as witnessed by the involvement of the Committee of the Regions, which considered that counter-radicalization should primarily remain the responsibility of local authorities. The last initiative in this field, namely the Stockholm Programme, reflects the European approach to fighting terrorism by integrating a wide range of policies in a coherent and comprehensive framework.

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<sup>95</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/justice\\_home/news/intro/doc/stockholm\\_program\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/news/intro/doc/stockholm_program_en.pdf)



## **8. Conclusions**

The main goal of CRIME was to improve insight into the radicalisation process, radical groups and how to halt and prevent radicalisation. This was divided into four sub-goals. First, to develop typologies of a number of different operational radical groups. Second, to develop a model, which describes the process through which an individual goes on the path from moderation to radical extremism and terrorism. Third, to survey interventions intended to halt or prevent radicalisation and map these onto the process model. Fourth, to present an overview of EU guidelines and policy regarding radicalisation. To achieve these goals, we conducted literature studies; four workshop, three of which were with professionals from the field; and interviews with professionals.

The development of the typologies yielded graphic representations of the current state of three types of radical groups: nationalist/separatist groups, leftist groups and radical Islamic groups. In addition, we explored the nature of leftist groups in the 1970's and 80's in order to illustrate the evolution of this type of group. What these representations show is that different types of radical groups have different natures in terms of factors such as support base, positions and status in regards to their area of operation etc.; they cannot all be lumped together, but must be dealt with in manners befitting their nature. This has implications for policy and interventions designed to deal with these groups in order to reduce on the one hand their opportunities for radical/terrorist activities, and on the other, the availability and accessibility of potential joiners and recruits. Furthermore, an improved understanding of the nature of these groups improves insight into expectations for future development and activities.

The process model of radicalisation gives a systematic overview of the elements involved in an individual's journey from moderation to radical extremism. The focus of this model is on the psychological processes occurring within the individual as an independent entity, and within the individual as part of a group. Given the method used to construct the model – that is a synthesis of existing models of radicalisation – it is the most integrative model of which we are currently aware. This synthesis method is not only the model's virtue, however, but also its vice. When any method of data reduction is applied, such as a synthesis, there is always a loss of detail; this is the trade-off necessary to achieve a more encompassing and generalised view of reality. In the case of the process model, this is no different. Though we have a model with a strong conceptual basis



and a relatively complete set of elements, the model does not distinguish between potentially different paths taken by different radical groups, different individuals or that there may simply be different possible paths. In the end, having one model provides a relatively parsimonious overview of radicalisation. However, as the experts in Workshop 2 pointed out, it may be too general to be of much specific use in the field.

The work on interventions to halt or prevent radicalisation revealed that different phases of the radicalisation process require different intervention strategies. In the analysis conducted in CRIME, we have mapped (types of) interventions available and currently being implemented, to the phase in the process where they would be most effective. This mapping aids in identifying gaps where no suitable interventions are available, determining when to choose one intervention over the other, further honing of existing interventions and developing new ones, and detailing how best to use particular interventions. In this way, it is possible to make better choices as to how to help a high-risk individual.

Clearly, the work we have done in CRIME, while extensive, leaves room for further development. Specifically, the long-term recommendations provided by the workshop participants need to be examined and incorporated. These include on the one hand a “splitting” of the model to represent different radical groups or different types of individuals, similar in fact to what was done in the typologies. On the other hand, the model needs more details regarding, for example, determinants, mediators, and other influential factors. CRIME has ultimately yielded two models, which provide views of both sides of the radicalisation coin: who and how. Future work could focus on more explicitly integrating these models in order to form a more unified overview.

The next concrete step in research is the FP7 project, SAFIRE (Scientific Approach to Fighting Radical Extremism), which is currently being negotiated. In CRIME the focus was on the individual. In SAFIRE radical groups are examined as dynamic systems are looked at how they evolve and what triggers their change. In addition, observable indicators of radicalisation will be defined and principles of interventions are developed based on, among other things the work in CRIME, and these principles will be applied in a longitudinal, empirical study. The relationship between radicalisation and national culture, and radicalisation and the Internet will be addressed. The goal of SAFIRE is to improve understanding of both conceptual aspects of radicalisation (e.g. the psycho-social dynamics of radical groups), and practical characteristics and modus operandi of radical groups (e.g. recruitment techniques). In addition, the results will



increase the understanding of field efforts and interventions – when, why and how they work – thus helping focus the allocation of resources and the implementation of interventions.



## **Appendix 1: List of Expert input**

A.G. Advies, The Netherlands

CATS, Swedish National Defence College, Sweden

Centre for Terrorism and Counter Terrorism, Leiden University, Campus Den Haag, The Netherlands

City of Amsterdam, The Netherlands

Clingendael Institute, The Netherlands

Dutch intelligence service, The Netherlands

Embassy of Spain, Spain

Federal office for the protection of the constitution, Germany

FOD, Belgium

IVA, Tilburg, The Netherlands

KPC, The Netherlands

Movisie, Netherlands centre for social development, The Netherlands

NCTB, Dutch Coordinator for Counter terrorism, The Netherlands

PET, Denmark

Police Birmingham, UK

Police Limburg south, The Netherlands

RAND EUROPE, UK

Sonor Stichting onderneming opbouwwerk Rotterdam, The Netherlands

START, University of Maryland, USA/France

STIOM The Hague, The Netherlands

VU/University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands



## Appendix 2: EU actions overview

13 June 2002	COUNCIL FRAMEWORK DECISION on combating terrorism	<a href="http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2002:164:0003:0007:EN:PDF">http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2002:164:0003:0007:EN:PDF</a>
25 March 2004	DECLARATION ON COMBATING TERRORISM / Condemnation of the Madrid bombings	<a href="http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/DECL-25.3.pdf">http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/DECL-25.3.pdf</a>
20.10.2004	COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT Prevention, preparedness and response to terrorist attacks	<a href="http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/doc_centre/criminal/terrorism/doc/com_2004_698_en.pdf">http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/doc_centre/criminal/terrorism/doc/com_2004_698_en.pdf</a>
4/5 November 2004	Presidency Conclusions ANNEX I THE HAGUE PROGRAMME STRENGTHENING FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION	<a href="http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/news/information_dossiers/the_hague_priorities/doc/hague_programme_en.pdf">http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/news/information_dossiers/the_hague_priorities/doc/hague_programme_en.pdf</a>
10.5.2005	COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT The Hague Programme: Ten priorities for the next five years The Partnership for European renewal in the field of Freedom, Security and Justice	<a href="http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/news/information_dossiers/the_hague_priorities/doc/com_2005_184_en.pdf">http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/news/information_dossiers/the_hague_priorities/doc/com_2005_184_en.pdf</a>
7 June 2005	Text adopted by the EP: European Parliament recommendation to the European Council and the Council on terrorist attacks: prevention, preparation and response	<a href="http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+20050607+ITEMS+DOC+XML+Vo//EN#sdocta9">http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+20050607+ITEMS+DOC+XML+Vo//EN#sdocta9</a>
7 June 2005	Text adopted by the EP: European	<a href="http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/g">http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/g</a>



	Parliament recommendation to the European Council and the Council on the EU anti-terrorism Action Plan	etDoc.do?pubRef=- //EP//TEXT+TA+20050607+ITEMS+DOC+XML+Vo//EN#sdocta9
13 July 2005	PRESS RELEASE Extraordinary Council meeting Justice and Home Affairs Condemnation of the bombings in London	<a href="http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/jha/85703.pdf">http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/jha/85703.pdf</a>
21.9.2005	COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Concerning Terrorist recruitment: addressing the factors contributing to violent radicalisation	<a href="http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2005:0313:FIN:EN:PDF">http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2005:0313:FIN:EN:PDF</a>
October 2005	Burgess Report: Critical assessment of Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council concerning terrorist recruitment -- Addressing the factors contributing to violent radicalisation (COM/2005/0313 final), European Parliament, Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs	
24 November 2005	"I/A" ITEM NOTE from : Presidency to : COREPER Subject: The European Union Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism	<a href="http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/05/st14/st14781-re01.en05.pdf">http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/05/st14/st14781-re01.en05.pdf</a>
30 November 2005	COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION NOTE from : Presidency and CT Co-ordinator to : Council/European Council Subject : The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy	<a href="http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/05/st14/st14469-re04.en05.pdf">http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/05/st14/st14469-re04.en05.pdf</a>
December 2005	Justice and Home Affairs Council adopted the European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy	<a href="http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/terrorism/strategies/fsj_terrorism_strategies_counter_en.htm">http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/terrorism/strategies/fsj_terrorism_strategies_counter_en.htm</a>



12 December 2005	NOTE from : Counter-Terrorism Coordinator to :European Council Subject : Implementation of the Action Plan to Combat Terrorism	<a href="http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/05/st15/st15704.en05.pdf">http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/05/st15/st15704.en05.pdf</a>
19 April 2006	Commission Decision setting up a group of experts to provide policy advice to the Commission on fighting violent radicalisation	<a href="http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:111:0009:01:EN:HTML">http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:111:0009:01:EN:HTML</a>
27 September 2006	COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION Communication of the EU policies and objectives in counter- terrorism	<a href="http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/st13252en06.pdf">http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/st13252en06.pdf</a>
26 October 2006	Commission Decision C(2006) 5025 on Financing a Pilot Project containing a set of preparatory actions with a view to strengthening the fight against terrorism	
	COMMISSION PROGRAMME FOR THE PREVENTION OF AND RESPONSE TO VIOLENT RADICALISATION 2007 CALL FOR PROPOSALS	<a href="http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/funding/2004_2007/radicalisation/doc/call_2007_en.pdf">http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/funding/2004_2007/radicalisation/doc/call_2007_en.pdf</a>
29 March 2007	COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION NOTE from : Presidency and CT Coordinator Subject : EU Action Plan on combating terrorism Latest version of the EU Action Plan on combating terrorism	<a href="http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/07/st07/st07233-re01.en07.pdf">http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/07/st07/st07233-re01.en07.pdf</a>
14 May 2007	EU COUNCIL SECRETARIAT ~FACTSHEET~ THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM	<a href="http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/FactsheetfightagainstterrorismENrev1.pdf">http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/FactsheetfightagainstterrorismENrev1.pdf</a>
23 November 2007	COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION NOTE from : Counter-terrorism Coordinator to : Coreper/Council	<a href="http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/07/st15/st15443.en07.pdf">http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/07/st15/st15443.en07.pdf</a>



	Subject : The EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment - Implementation report	
29 November 2007	COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION CORRIGENDUM TO NOTE from : Counter-terrorism Coordinator to : Coreper/Council Subject : The EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment - Implementation report	<a href="http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/07/st15/st15443-co01.en07.pdf">http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/07/st15/st15443-co01.en07.pdf</a>
6 and 7 December 2007	COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EU COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGY 2838th JUSTICE and HOME AFFAIRS Council meeting	<a href="http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/IMPLEMENTATION-OF-THE-EU-COUNTER-TERRORISM-STRATEGY-EN.pdf">http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/IMPLEMENTATION-OF-THE-EU-COUNTER-TERRORISM-STRATEGY-EN.pdf</a>
15 May 2008	Radicalisation Processes Leading to Acts of Terrorism A concise Report prepared by the European Commission's Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation	<a href="http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2008/20080500_cscp_report_vries.pdf">http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2008/20080500_cscp_report_vries.pdf</a>
8 July 2008	COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION Council Conclusions on enhancing cooperation in the area of countering radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism 28822nd ECONOMIC and FINANCIAL AFFAIRS Council meeting	<a href="http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/101728.pdf">http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/101728.pdf</a>
19/08/2008	Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Prevention of terrorism and violent radicalisation	<a href="http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:211:0061:01:EN:HTML">http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:211:0061:01:EN:HTML</a>
26 November 2009	COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION NOTE from : EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator (CTC) to : Council / European Council Subject : EU Action Plan on combating	<a href="http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st15/st15358.en09.pdf">http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st15/st15358.en09.pdf</a>



	terrorism	
26 November 2009	COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION NOTE from : EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator to : Council/European Council Subject : EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy - discussion paper	<a href="http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st15/st15359-re01.en09.pdf">http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st15/st15359-re01.en09.pdf</a>
27 November 2009	ADDENDUM TO NOTE from : EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator to : Council / European Council Subject : EU Action Plan on combating terrorism	<a href="http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st15/st15358-ado1re01.en09.pdf">http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st15/st15358-ado1re01.en09.pdf</a>
2 December 2009	NOTE from : Presidency to : General Affairs Council/European Council Subject : The Stockholm Programme – An open and secure Europe serving and protecting the citizens	<a href="http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/news/intro/doc/stockholm_program_en.pdf">http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/news/intro/doc/stockholm_program_en.pdf</a>



## Appendix 3: Workshop III: Interventions

In the third workshop, participants (scientists, professionals on policy level and professionals from the field), were asked to evaluate the case of R. through group discussion. The case and discussion instructions are presented below.

### **Case: The radicalisation of R.**

R. is a 17 year old Muslim boy who was born in Romania. His parents were born in Morocco. When he was eight he and his parents moved to the Netherlands because his father could not find a job in Romania. R. was sad to leave, because he had to leave his friends and he had a special bond with his Romanian Imam. His parents never really learned the Dutch language, but R. was able to learn it properly. When he was 16 R.'s mother died of cancer and his father could not work anymore, because of serious back problems. R. was always a good student at school, though lately he has not been coming to school much. Everyone in his surroundings can see that he changed his behaviour and appearance. He will not go to the local mosque anymore because he thinks the Imam there is "weak". He starts to wear traditional Islamic clothing and he now has a long beard. Furthermore, he has alienated himself from his family and former friends. He has started to associate with a group of boys who look just like him. They do not shake women's hands, are hateful to other Muslims because they say they do not know true Islam, and they speak with disgust about non-believers. R. spends a lot of time behind the computer. His father is scared and has the feeling he is surfing radical Islamic websites; he is really worried. In the last month R. has travelled to France a couple of times. His father is worried, because in his room he has found information on a radical French Imam and he feels he has no control over what his son is doing in France.

Discuss with each other (30-45 min):

*What are useful ways of handling this case?*

You can think of aspects such as:

1. What are possible interventions for this specific case?
2. Who should carry out these interventions?
3. What are responsibilities for each country involved? Does every country have responsibilities in handling this case?